Here is the simple, shameful truth: I don't much like politics. It is infuriating, frustrating, desperately important, and I cannot really do anything about it. What I like is ideas, which are simple, pure, eternal, and as satisfying as a Baroque fugue. I talk about politics because I think I should, but I would rather talk about ideas.
So today, I am going to talk about an elegant much-misunderstood idea: the idea of a zero-sum game. Now, as it happens, I have already done just that, nine years ago, but it was on my other blog, which most readers of this blog do not even know exists. So, herewith, from that blog, my formal explanation of the concept of a zero-sum game, very lightly edited. Even if it does not grab you, perhaps you will be able to appreciate its peaceful clarity:
At long last, we are ready to state the six assumptions
about someone's preferences, or Axioms, as von Neuman and Morgenstern call
them, the positing of which is sufficient to allow us to deduce that the
person's preferences over a set of outcomes can be represented by a Cardinal
Utility Function. There is a very great deal of hairy detail that I am going to
skip over, for two reasons. The first is that I want there to be someone still
reading this when I get done. The second is that it is just too much trouble to
try to get all this symbolism onto my blog. You can find the detail in Luce and
Raiffa. O.K., here we go.
Assume there is a set of n outcomes,
or prizes, O = (O1, O2, ...., On)
AXIOM I: The individual has a weak preference
ordering over O, with O1 the most preferred and On the least preferred, and
this ordering is complete and transitive. Thus, using R to mean “prefers or is
indifferent between,” for any Oi and Oj, either Oi R Oj or Oj R Oi. Also, If Oi
R Oj, and Oj R Ok, then Oi R Ok.
AXIOM II: [A biggie] The individual is indifferent
between any Compound Lottery and the Simple Lottery over O derived from the
Compound Lottery by the ordinary mathematical process of reducing a compound
lottery to a simple lottery.
This a very powerful axiom. In effect, it says that the individual has
neither a taste for nor an aversion to any distribution of risk. The point is
that the Compound Lotteries may exhibit a very broad spread of risk, whereas
the Simple Lottery derived from them by the reduction process may have a very
narrow spread of risk. Or vice versa. The individual doesn't care about that.
AXIOM III: For any prize or outcome Oi, there is some
Lottery over just the most and least preferred outcomes such that the
individual is indifferent between that Lottery and the outcome Oi. A Lottery
over just the most and least preferred outcomes is a Lottery that assigns some
probability p to the most preferred outcome, O1, and a probability (1-p) to the
least preferred outcome, On, and zero probability to all the other outcomes.
Think of this as a needle on a scale marked 0 to 1. You show the person the
outcome Oi, and then you slide the needle back and forth between the 1, which
is labeled O1 and the 0 [zero] which is labeled On. Somewhere between those two
extremes, this Axiom says, there is a balancing point of probabilities that the
person considers exactly as good as the certainty of Oi. Call that point Ui. It
is the point that assigns a probability of Ui to O1 and a probability of (1 -
Ui) to On.
We are now going to give a name to
the Lottery we are discussing, namely the Lottery [UiO1, (1- Ui)On]. We are
going to call it Õi . Thus, according to this Axiom and our symbolism, the
player A is indifferent between Oi and Õi.
If you have good mathematical intuition
and are following this closely, it may occur to you that this number between 1
and 0, Ui, is going to turn out to be the Utility Index assigned to Oi in A's
cardinal utility function. You would be right.
This Axiom is essentially a
continuity axiom, and it is very, very powerful. It implies a number of
important things. First, it implies that A does NOT have a lexicographic
preference order. All of the outcomes are, in A's eyes, commensurable with one
another, in the sense that for each of them, A is indifferent between it and
some mix or other of the most and the least preferred outcomes. It also implies
that we can, so far as A's preferences are concerned, reduce any Lottery,
however complex, to some Simple Lottery over just O1 and On. The Axiom guarantees
that there is such a Lottery. Notice also that this Axiom implies that A is
capable of making infinitely fine discriminations of preference between
Lotteries. In short, this is one of those idealizing or simplifying assumptions
[like continuous production functions] that economists make so that they can
use fancy math.
AXIOM IV. In any lottery, Õ can be substituted for
Oi. Remember, Axiom III says that A is indifferent between Õi and Oi. This
axiom says that when you substitute Õi for Oi in a lottery, A is indifferent
between the old lottery and the new one. In effect, this says that the
surrounding or context in which you carry out the substitution makes no
difference to A. For example, the first lottery might assign a probability of
.4 to the outcome Oi, while the new lottery assigns the same probability, .4,
to Õi. [If you are starting to get lost, remember that Õi is the lottery over
just O1 and On, such that A is indifferent between that lottery and the pure
outcome Oi.]
AXIOM V. Preference and Indifference among lottery
tickets are transitive relations. So if A prefers Lottery 1 to Lottery 2, and
Lottery 2 to Lottery 3, then A will prefer Lottery 1 to Lottery 3. Also, if A
is indifferent between Lottery 1 and Lottery 2, and is indifferent between
Lottery 2 and Lottery 3, then A will be indifferent between Lottery 1 and
Lottery 3. This is a much stronger Axiom than it looks, as we shall see
presently.
If you put Axioms I through V
together, they imply something very powerful, namely that for any Lottery, L,
there is a lottery over just O1 and On, such that A is indifferent between L
and that lottery over O1 and On. We need to go through the proof of this in
order to prepare for the wrap up last axiom.
Let L be the lottery (p1O1,
p2O2, ...., pnOn), with the probabilities p summing to 1.
Now, for each Oi in L, substitute
Õi. Axioms III and IV say this can be done.
So, using our previous notation,
where xIy means A is indifferent between x and y,
(p1O1, ..., pnOn)
I (p1Õ1, ..., pnÕn) so, expanding the right side,
(p1O1, ..., pnOn)
I (p1[U1O1, (1-U1)On]), ...., (pn[UnOn, (1-Un)On) or,
multiplying
(p1O1, ..., pnOn)
I ([p1U1 + p2U2 + ... + pnUn]O1, [p1{1-U1}
+ .... + pn{1-Un}On]) or
(p1O1, ..., pnOn)
I ([p1U1 + p2U2 + ... + pnUn]O1, [p1{1-U1} +
... + pn{1-Un}]On)
if we let p = p1U1 + p2U2
+ ... pnUn then we have:
(p1O1, ..., pnOn)
I (pO1, (1-p)On) In other words, the lottery, L, with which we started is
indifferent to a lottery just over the best and worst outcomes, O1 and On.
AXIOM VI The last axiom says that if p and p' are two
probabilities, i.e., two real numbers between 1 and 0, then: (pO1, [1-p]On) R
(p'O1, [1-p']On) if and only if p ≥ p'
This Axiom says that the individual
[A in our little story] prefers [or is indifferent between] one lottery over
the best and the worst alternatives to another lottery over those same two
alternatives if and only if the probability assigned to O1 in the first lottery
is equal to or greater than the probability assigned to O1 in the second
lottery.
Now, let us draw a deep breath, step
out of the weeds, and remember what we have just done. First, we started with a
finite set of outcomes, O = (O1, O2, ...., On). Then we defined a simple
lottery over the set O as a probability distribution over the set O. Then we
defined a compound lottery as a lottery whose prizes include tickets in simple
lotteries. At this point, we introduced five AXIOMS or assumptions about the
preferences that our sample individual A has over the set of outcomes and
simple and compound lotteries of those outcomes. These are not deductions. They
are assumptions. Then we showed that these five Axioms, taken together, imply a
very powerful conclusion. Finally, we introduced a sixth Axiom or assumption
about A's preferences.
That is where we are now. von Neuman
now takes the last step, and shows that if someone's preferences obey all six
Axioms, then that person's preferences can be represented by a cardinal utility
function over those outcomes that is invariant up to an affine (linear)
transformation. I am not going to go through the proof, which consists mostly
of substituting and multiplying through and gathering terms and all that good
stuff. Suffice it to say that when von Neuman gets all done, he has shown that
one way of assigning utility indices to the outcomes in O in conformity with
the six Axioms is to assign to each outcome Oi the number Ui [as defined
above]. This is then "the utility to A of Oi." Remember that this is
just one way of assigning A's utility indices to the outcomes in the set O. Any
affine transformation of those assignments will serve just as well.
All of this has to be true about
A's preferences in order for us to say that A's preferences can be represented
by a cardinal utility function.
I want now to take some time to make sure that everyone
understands just how strong these assumptions are, and also exactly how to
interpret them. The first point to understand is in a way the hardest. You
might think that our subject, A, decides how she feels about all of these
simple and compound lotteries by carrying out expected utility calculations and
then saying to herself, "Well, since this one has a greater mathematical
expectation than that one, I prefer this one to that one." You might think
that, because, good heavens, how else could she possibly decide which she
prefers to which? But if you thought that [which of course none of you does],
you would be WRONG, WRONG, WRONG! TOTALLY WRONG, WRONG, WRONG! That
would be, to use correctly a phrase that these days is almost always used
incorrectly, begging the question. It would be assuming what is to
be proved, and thus arguing in a circle. What von Neuman actually supposes is
that our subject, A, looks at the outcomes O1, O2, etc and decides how she
feels about them. She ranks them in order of her preference. She then looks at
the infinitude of simple lotteries and compound lotteries and decides how she
feels about them as well. She merges this all in her mind into a single
complete, transitive ordering of all of those outcomes and simple lotteries and
compound lotteries. Then von Neuman posits that her preferences,
thus arrived at, in fact obey the six Axioms. If that is so, then,
von Neuman shows, her preferences can be represented AS THOUGH she
were carrying out expected utility calculations in her head in accordance with
the axioms.
We are talking here about an
enormously powerful set of idealizing and simplifying assumptions, as powerful
in their way as the assumptions economists have to make before they can talk
about continuously twice differentiable production functions [which they need
in order to prove their nifty equilibrium theorems.] Let me draw on something I
said earlier to show you just how powerful these Axioms are. Look at Axiom V,
the transitivity axiom, and let us recall the eye doctor example.
Suppose that
the lotteries A is comparing are big Amusement Park wheels, on which are marked
off different sized wedges [each defined by two radii], each one of which is
associated with one of the outcomes in the set, O. It would be no problem at
all to construct a whole series of wheels, each of which is such a tiny bit
different from the one next to it that when A is shown the two wheels together,
she looks at them and says, I am indifferent between those two lotteries."
But suitably arranged, the series of wheels might very slowly, indiscernibly,
alter the size of the wedges associated with two prizes or outcomes, Oi and Oj,
until, if we were to show A the first and the last in the series, she would
look at them and say, flatly, I prefer the one on the left to the one on the
right. Whoops. No transitivity! Axiom V rules out any such state of affairs.
Well, you can think about each one
of the Axioms and see whether you can imagine a situation in which the
assumption of that Axiom clearly requires something very strong and even counterintuitive. But rather than go on about that, I am going to take the next
step.
We are now ready to extend our
notion of strictly opposed preference orders. Recall that we describe the
preference orders of A and B over a set of outcomes, O, as "strictly
opposed" when A prefers Oi to Oj or is indifferent between them if and
only if B prefers Oj to Oi or is indifferent between them. We will describe the
preference orders of A and B over the infinite set of lotteries, simple and
compound, over the set of outcomes, O, as "strictly competitive" when
A prefers Lottery L1 to Lottery L2 or is indifferent between them if and only
if B prefers L2 to L1 or is indifferent between them. This means that A and B
not only rank all of the outcomes in exactly opposite ways. They also rank all
of the lotteries, simple or compound, over those outcomes in exactly opposite
ways.
In this very specific set of
circumstances [where all six axioms apply to both A's preferences and B's
preferences, and A and B have strictly competitive preferences], we can
normalize the utility functions of A and B so that for any lottery, L, simple
or compound, over the set of outcomes, O, the sum of the utility index assigned
to L by A's utility function and the utility index assigned to L by B's utility
function is a constant. This is what is meant by saying that a game played by A
and B is a constant sum game.
Rather than grind out an algebraic
proof, I will offer a simple, intuitive proof that should be easy to grasp. We
shall use u(L) to mean the utility that A's utility function assigns to L, and
u'(L) to mean the utility that B's utility function assigns to L. Now, we are
permitted arbitrarily to let A's most preferred outcome, O1, have a utility of
1, and A's least preferred outcome have a utility of 0. Since A and B have
strictly opposed preferences for outcomes, B's most preferred outcome is On and
his least preferred outcome is O1. We are permitted to set B's utility for On
equal to 1 and for O1 equal to 0. So the utility assignments of both A and B can
be portrayed as lying along a line that runs between 1 and 0.
No matter what lottery, L, we have
chosen, we know from the Axioms that it is equivalent, for A, to some lottery
over just O1 and On whose probability weights are u and (1-u) for some u. Think
of that as a point somewhere on the line running between 1 and 0. [Remember
that for the best and worst alternatives, O1 and On, the point is an endpoint
of the line.] The same thing is true for B. We are now going to prove that the
point on the line representing A's utility for L and the point on the line
representing B's utility for L are the same point. To prove this, we will
assume the contrary and derive a contradiction with our assumption that A and B
have strictly opposed preferences. So, let us choose a point representing u(L)
and a different point representing u'(L), and then choose some point that lies
between those two points, which we shall call S. Here is a picture of the
situation. The line runs from 1 to 0 for A, and from 0 to 1 for B:
1 0
|---------u(L)---------------S-------------u'(L)-------------|
0 1
The point S represents a lottery,
Ls, with weights S for On and (1-S) for O1. Now, just from looking at the
diagram, we can see the following:
(i) A prefers L to Ls, because L
puts greater weight on O1 than Ls does. [u(L) is closer to the 1 than S is].
(ii) B prefers L to Ls, because L
puts greater weight on On [his favorite] than Ls does. [u'(L) is closer
to his 1 than S is.]
But this means that A and B do not
have strictly opposed preferences, since they both prefer L to Ls. And this
contradicts the assumption. So no matter which lottery L we choose, there
cannot be a point S between u(L) and u'(L), which means they are the same
point.
But if they are the same point, then
A's utility is u and B's utility is u' = (1-u), regardless of which lottery, L,
we choose. and:
u + u' = u + (1-u) =
1
Now, B's utility function is
invariant under an affine (linear) transformation. So let us introduce the
following affine transformation:
u'' = u' - 1
What this does is to re-label B's
utility assignments so that instead of running from 1 to 0, the run from 0 to
-1. This means that A's and B's utilities for any arbitrary lottery L are no
longer u and (1-u). Instead, they are now u and -u. And the sum of u and
-u is zero.
THIS, AND ONLY THIS, IS WHAT IS
MEANT BY SAYING THAT A GAME PLAYED BY A AND B IS A ZERO-SUM GAME.