tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5687347459208158501.post1606717049974912786..comments2024-03-19T06:22:40.011-04:00Comments on The Philosopher's Stone: SMALL PLEASURESRobert Paul Wolffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11970360952872431856noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5687347459208158501.post-46632189916340271372016-08-01T21:33:51.407-04:002016-08-01T21:33:51.407-04:00I have got a question for you Professor Wolff (I h...I have got a question for you Professor Wolff (I have asked other Kant scholars). I think that Kant subscribes to meta-logical principles: a containment theory of logical consequence and a containment theory of analyticity. In a logically valid inference the conclusion is contained in the premises and (at least in simple simple cases) in an analytic truth the predicate is contained in the subject. (The question is of interest because if you put the two together and apply them to ethics you get a fairly strong form of No-Ought-From-Is.) Does this seem right to you?Charles Pigdenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01131765562671298571noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5687347459208158501.post-58233663605045657642016-07-28T15:12:08.658-04:002016-07-28T15:12:08.658-04:00Very nice. I had forgotten that passage.Very nice. I had forgotten that passage.Robert Paul Wolffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11970360952872431856noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5687347459208158501.post-26912600808346195012016-07-28T14:46:11.501-04:002016-07-28T14:46:11.501-04:00There's also this excitement from CPR A790=B81...There's also this excitement from CPR A790=B818:<br /><br />The real cause for the use of apagogic proofs in various sciences is probably this. If the grounds from which a certain cognition should be derived are too manifold or lie too deeply hidden, then one tries whether they may not be reached through their consequences. Now modus ponens, inferring the truth of a cognition from the truth of its consequences, would be allowed only if all of the possible consequences are true; for in this case only a single ground of this is possible, which is therefore also the true one.24 But this procedure is unusable, because to have insight into all possible consequences of any proposition that is assumed exceeds our powers; yet one uses this kind of inference, though to be sure with a certain degree of care, if it is merely a matter of proving something as an hypothesis, since there an inference by analogy is allowed: that, namely, if as many consequences as one has tested agree with an assumed ground then all other possible ones will also agree with it. (Guyer and Wood)Charles Youngnoreply@blogger.com