tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5687347459208158501.post4475132470560504526..comments2024-03-29T03:19:09.227-04:00Comments on The Philosopher's Stone: A REPLY TO MARINUSRobert Paul Wolffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11970360952872431856noreply@blogger.comBlogger1125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5687347459208158501.post-59110996187391322292011-04-20T01:14:22.938-04:002011-04-20T01:14:22.938-04:00My claim was more modest than that the PD offers a...My claim was more modest than that the PD offers a serious challenge for rational choice theory (though I see how especially the last paragraph might invite the reader to think otherwise), it was that one reason to study the PD is that it has this interesting result about the conflict between utility-maximisation and Pareto-optimality (that, and the fact that it has such many analytical uses). If we care about Pareto-optimality and utility-maximisation (and almost everybody in the field does, very much) then we should address the fact that, in a range of significant cases, they conflict. <br /><br />I do claim that this is a problem for the decision theorist (with cases like the tragedy of the commons showing how large a problem this might be); in fact, I am frequently surprised and somewhat disappointed by the fact that this conflict is so rarely commented on, given that it is a straightforward result of the PD. This, I hope, is sufficient reason to take the PD seriously, which is the conclusion I was intending to argue towards.<br /><br />That said, there is something to be said in reply to what you have written here. While the difference between decision under uncertainty and under certainty is certainly important, it has no bearing in PD cases. The problem isn't that there are hidden consequences to our action. The issue is that the structure of pay-offs (which is perfectly transparent to those involved) makes it that you have a move to a Pareto-suboptimal outcome. For instance, in the canonical prisoner's dilemma, if you are <i>certain</i> the other prisoner will defect, you will defect too, and if you are <i>certain</i> the other player will not defect, you will defect as well, given that you are a utility-maximiser. You will defect night and day, rain or shine, because it is the dominant strategy. And therein lies the problem. The amount of information available to the agent isn't what is at issue here, it is the structure of the pay-offs.Marinushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13492009758043047531noreply@blogger.com