tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5687347459208158501.post4946584265755907270..comments2024-03-29T03:19:09.227-04:00Comments on The Philosopher's Stone: THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA CONCLUSIONRobert Paul Wolffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11970360952872431856noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5687347459208158501.post-89500619190499748632014-02-14T18:27:26.829-05:002014-02-14T18:27:26.829-05:00I read somewhere that game theory is only good for...I read somewhere that game theory is only good for predicting the behavior of game theorists. I think it’s also good for disarming a lot of bad free-market triumphalism. That’s what I picked up from Sam Bowles’s "Microeconomics." Whether the free market works its magic or not depends on the situation. Bowles treats mutually beneficial trade as just one of many possible strategic interactions (he calls it the invisible hand, and it’s lumped in with the prisoner’s dilemma and the stag hunt). He’s got a great example:<br /><br /><i>Like the overnight train that left me in an empty field some distance from the settlement, the process of economic development has for the most part bypassed the two hundred or so families that make up the village of Palanpur. They have remained poor, even by Indian standards: less than a third of the adults are literate, and most have endured the loss of a child to malnutrition or to illnesses that are long forgotten in other parts of the world. But for the occasional wristwatch, bicycle, or irrigation pump, Palanpur appears to be a timeless backwater, untouched by India’s cutting edge software industry and booming agricultural regions. Seeking to understand why, I approached a sharecropper and his three daughters weeding a small plot. The conversation eventually turned to the fact that Palanpur farmers sow their winter crops several weeks after the date at which yields would be maximized. The farmers do not doubt that earlier planting would give them larger harvests, but no one the farmer explained, is willing to be the first to plant, as the seeds on any lone plot would be quickly eaten by birds. I asked if a large group of farmers, perhaps relatives, had ever agreed to sow earlier, all planting on the same day to minimize losses. “If we knew how to do that,” he said, looking up from his hoe at me, “we would not be poor.”<br /></i>chrismealyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05591805477096884764noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5687347459208158501.post-7744000459877439832014-02-11T04:53:30.511-05:002014-02-11T04:53:30.511-05:00That is fascinating. It calls to mind tghe follow...That is fascinating. It calls to mind tghe following fact about Two Person Games: If the game is zero sum [see my elaborate explanatgion of exactly what "zero sum" actually means -- it is quite p[recisely defined by von N eumann] then there can not be a lolcal maximum. All maxima are equal, hence the players are indifference among them. But in a two person game that is not zero sum, there can be a nujmber oif local maxima, many of which are inferior to the greatest local maximum. In that c ase, players could quite easily get stuck at a local maximum, because a small move by either one away from that point would be inferior for the player. Robert Paul Wolffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11970360952872431856noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5687347459208158501.post-70252542476543607732014-02-10T18:56:47.279-05:002014-02-10T18:56:47.279-05:00A complete aside - I do a fair bit of programming ...A complete aside - I do a fair bit of programming and statistics in my spare time. In my travels I often have to maximize a function that comes from the "real world" - meaning, it isn't nicely behaved like a line, or even stable over time. To maximize it, a favourite trick is simulated annealing. Basically, you have two states: (1) the rational state where you basically "walk uphill" from where ever you are located till you get to the top of the hill; or (2) once you get to the top of a hill, you take a random jump somewhere and repeat the rational state to see if you can do better (you keep track of your previous best and return to it if the random jump didn't help). As the algorithm runs, you make the random jumps smaller and smaller - at which point you are (probably) at a global maximum.<br /><br />The key here is the counter-intuitive "leap of faith" stage. A lot of logical analysis is of the rational type - keep marching uphill - but the algorithm requires those random leaps to make sure you don't get caught in a local minimum.<br /><br />I've found myself using that algorithm as a nice metaphor (or excuse, depending on the situation) for NOT doing the logical thing. A lot of life seems like we are built with simulated annealing machinery built into us. But mainly, it gave me the insight that logical thinking can be self-defeating because it tends to be very limited in its timeframe.<br /><br />In the prisoner's dilemma case, I'm sure that it comes up all the time, with all the complexity and messiness you point out. But I think about a human response to this - honour, friendship and love. If the two criminals are friends, or even lovers, then they sidestep the logical thing to do and jump straight to the optimal solution - don't squeal!<br /><br />I've gotten a fair kick out of the prisoners dilemma over time thinking about it in this way - logic is a tool, but certainly not the only one.LeadingIndicatorshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03823469998122628157noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5687347459208158501.post-81433309087276892812014-02-08T07:50:39.932-05:002014-02-08T07:50:39.932-05:00David, I took a look at the YouTube link. It is m...David, I took a look at the YouTube link. It is marvelous. It is actually an example of what Schelling calls a coordination game, a lovely one. Schelling has a great discussion of them in THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT.Robert Paul Wolffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11970360952872431856noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5687347459208158501.post-61315625491300176742014-02-05T11:17:59.875-05:002014-02-05T11:17:59.875-05:00Hello! Long time listener, approximately first-ti...Hello! Long time listener, approximately first-time caller.<br /><br />I have a question.<br /><br />I've studied some of the discussions in the traditional literature about this problem. I've read through your comments about it. I think it's a really great collection of posts: thank you.<br /><br />Now for the question. Suppose my interest in the Prisoner's Dilemma has nothing to do with a confusion about whether it is meant to be descriptive of actual situations of rational choice, or whether it is meant to be a prescription for how to choose in those situations. That is to say, I'm making neither of the mistakes you mention explicitly, I think.<br /><br />Instead, my interest is this: It seems to me intuitive that adopting a rational strategy for choosing between options I have on my own ought to be compatible, or the same as, or interestingly related to my strategy for choosing between options I have when I am part of a group. One such strategy that seems should work is a "dominance" strategy. Given all of the rich complexities and details of a real-life situation, it seems to me still that I ought to be able to articulate a rational strategy for decision-making that would work -- and the one I choose on my own, I would hope, could harmonize usefully when used in a group, even if the strategy might change somewhat in that situation.<br /><br />I wonder if you reject even that, but I'm not sure -- I don't think it's actually discussed explicitly in the text. In any case, do you think I'm misguided if I'm interested in the Prisoner's Dilemma because it seems to me that it shows something interesting, and perhaps a little troubling, about the fact that plausible rational strategies that work well when I'm reasoning on my own seem to fail when generalized to a group?ZeroAltitudehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12677324922745473136noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5687347459208158501.post-75510893910739572522014-02-05T10:45:34.141-05:002014-02-05T10:45:34.141-05:00this makes a nice pairing with your posts (it'...this makes a nice pairing with your posts (it's very funny, it's not quite the prisoners' dilemma, and it's compatible with your critique...)<br />http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S0qjK3TWZE8David Auerbachhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15612242467208247588noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5687347459208158501.post-17006759256343964482014-02-05T08:31:12.156-05:002014-02-05T08:31:12.156-05:00Thanks for these 3 posts; very well done.Thanks for these 3 posts; very well done.Kent Schenkelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15465672862382742882noreply@blogger.com