tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5687347459208158501.post5688617613262157571..comments2024-03-29T03:19:09.227-04:00Comments on The Philosopher's Stone: READING THE CRITIQUE PART SIXTEENRobert Paul Wolffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11970360952872431856noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5687347459208158501.post-82451182096756622662011-08-17T23:08:26.903-04:002011-08-17T23:08:26.903-04:00Couldn't Kant get out of this by saying that t...Couldn't Kant get out of this by saying that the <i>form</i> of a concept is a rule and propositional but the content of the concept is not? That way you might be able to allow these concepts like free will that extend beyond the realm of knowledge without letting go of the idea that concepts are orders about uniting the sensory manifold. I'm not sure that I've said exactly what I mean, but you can see the idea. It's a rather uneasy spot to sit regardless.J.Vlasitshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10340794410334308312noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5687347459208158501.post-32049452797138129172011-08-17T14:53:38.136-04:002011-08-17T14:53:38.136-04:00Well, a rule is an instruction or set of instructi...Well, a rule is an instruction or set of instructions, in the imperative, grammatically speaking: "Do this, then do that, then do the other." This is a proposition. It does not assert something, to be sure, but it commands something. By contrast a concept, say the concept of a house or of a hammer or of a human being is not, at least as usually understood, expressed in the form of a rule or a command. So when Kant says that a concept is a rule, he is fundamentally altering the way we ordinarily think of concepts.Robert Paul Wolffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11970360952872431856noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5687347459208158501.post-80869266556399778822011-08-17T13:18:45.720-04:002011-08-17T13:18:45.720-04:00I'm really enjoying this series of posts. But ...I'm really enjoying this series of posts. But there's one point in this most recent one where I stumbled. You say: 'As [Kant] tells us, "a concept is always, as regards its form, something universal which serves as a rule." Thus, a concept has a propositional form.' I didn't grasp the link here---how do we move from a concept being a rule, to a concept having a propositional form? You might have thought that the rule might be: given input X, represent concept C. (Given such-and-such impressions, token the concept CAT!) I'm sure I'm missing something basic...Robbie Williamshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02081389310232077607noreply@blogger.com