tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5687347459208158501.post7210536609339175626..comments2024-03-28T06:07:03.667-04:00Comments on The Philosopher's Stone: WHAT IS ETHICS? OR IS IT WHAT ARE ETHICS?Robert Paul Wolffhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11970360952872431856noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5687347459208158501.post-27186360702348074262018-12-08T09:44:05.529-05:002018-12-08T09:44:05.529-05:00Dean, that's fair reply - but my point was tha...Dean, that's fair reply - but my point was that some very smart, perfectly serious philosophers have regarded the third question as not worth asking by *anybody*. And the second is in fact implicitly universalised - "is there", for whom? - and so unless it's qualified and localised, in which case it's not the same question, then it too falls under the not-implausibly ludicrous.<br /><br />It's at least arguable, is the point. Certainly not odd to argue over it.Michael Snoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5687347459208158501.post-27122924624881906382018-12-07T22:14:05.024-05:002018-12-07T22:14:05.024-05:00Wasn't the comment about arguing about which q...Wasn't the comment about arguing about which question to ask just an acknowledgement of divisions of labor in the academy? Some folks specialize in one bucket of questions, others in others. A debate about that division doesn't advance the work respecting any of the questions.Deannoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5687347459208158501.post-75666682484474109992018-12-07T18:25:01.210-05:002018-12-07T18:25:01.210-05:00If it's odd to argue about which of the three ...If it's odd to argue about which of the three questions should be asked, as you claim, and I don't disagree, how do we decide which question of the three to ask?<br /><br />Do we flip a coin? Does it depend on our personality? On the fact that each question will elicit different answers and we know in advance which answer we wish to elicit? s. wallersteinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17448905469871566228noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5687347459208158501.post-74739157644464035482018-12-07T14:31:54.729-05:002018-12-07T14:31:54.729-05:00And then there is "Leiter, Brian, Disagreemen...And then there is "Leiter, Brian, Disagreement, Anti-Realism About Reasons, and Inference to the Best Explanation (August 6, 2018). Available at SSRN: <a href="https://ssrn.com/abstract=3228060" rel="nofollow">https://ssrn.com/abstract=3228060</a> or <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3228060" rel="nofollow">http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3228060</a>.<br /><br />I'll include the abstract:<br /><br />"I[Prof Leiter, not me, of course] revisit, refine and defend an inference to the best explanation (IBE) argument for anti-realism about reasons for acting based on the history of intractable disagreement in moral philosophy. The four key premises of the argument are: 1. If there were objective reasons for action, epistemically-well-situated observers would eventually converge upon them after two thousand years; 2. Contemporary philosophers, as the beneficiaries of two thousand years of philosophy, are epistemically well-situated observers; 3. Contemporary philosophers have not converged upon reasons for action; 4. Conclusion: there are no objective reasons for action (IBE from the first three premises). The key premises of the IBE are (1) sentimentalism; (2) non-cognitivism about basic affects; and (3) philosophical arguments for what our reasons for action are always involve arguments that depend on a basic intuitive moral judgment (that can be explained in terms of a basic non-cognitive affect). All these premises are explored in detail, and various objections addressed."F Lengyelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16870219925438756983noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5687347459208158501.post-88509938971886192202018-12-07T12:50:23.796-05:002018-12-07T12:50:23.796-05:00Why would it be "odd to argue about what ques...Why would it be "odd to argue about what question ought to be asked"?<br /><br />Aside from the general truth that lots of philosophy consists in arguing over the question, lots of philosophers have argued for or against the very asking (or at least, the phrasing) of all of these particular questions. Bernard Williams, Rorty, Raymond Geuss - just to mention three recent philosophers - don't accept the legitimacy and/or worth of asking all of these questions.<br /><br />Indeed, a whole strain of Marxism, as I'm sure you're aware, bangs on about not needing to ask certain questions, or the fact that us still ask such questions in itself means we're going wrong.<br /><br />It's not a bad view, it seems to me, to write off the third as ludicrous, regard the second as misguided if it's intended to be more than a very local heuristic (and not a question best answered by philosophers!), and to therefore regard the first question as really the only one that's worth asking and worth attempting to answer philosophically (but, then, again, plenty of other disciplines and perspectives are going to need to weigh in, other than philosophy).Michael Snoreply@blogger.com