Thursday, April 21, 2011
A PICTURE FROM SOUTH AFRICA
PROMISES, PROMISES
Yesterday, I spend some time reading Professor Vallbé's lovely formatting of my Formal Methods tutorial. [One of my guilty pleasures is reading what I myself have written. I imagine my fascination with my own words is a much sublimated expression of the infantile fascination with one's own feces, but that is a subject for another post.] I noticed, with a frisson of dismay, that in the very beginning of the tutorial, I promised to discuss a number of applications of the formal materials that I never got around to. By the time I had worked my way through the rigors of Rational Choice Theory, Game Theory, and Collective Choice Theory, I was a bit tuckered out.
Fortunately, two of the broken promises -- discussions [and eviscerations] of Robert Nozick's ebullient ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA, and Jon Elster's methodological individualist rendering of Marx -- are easily rectified, inasmuch as I have published both of them as journal articles. The Nozick essay is in the Arizona Law Journal for 1977, not someplace, I imagine, that most readers of this blog would ordinarily look for amusement. The Elster piece, which I am proud to say is admired by Brian Leiter, appeared in The Canadian Journal of Philosophy in 1990.
I have now managed to access and download both of them on-line, and will post them on box.net shortly. My younger readers will be quite unimpressed by my ability to find and download journal articles on-line, but it actually took me a bit of doing. I am an adjunct professor at UNC Chapel Hill, inasmuch as I am teaching a graduate seminar there. But it seems that UNC, in a fit of anxiety about internet theft and such things, changes everyone's password every three months. I imagine they sent me a warning on my UNC email account, which they created automatically without bothering to tell me. Since I never use it and have no idea how to locate it, I never got the warning. Now, of course, I cannot log in to change it. It seems I must go to some obscure office somewhere on a campus I am unfamiliar with and get a new password. Fortunately, I am also an adjunct professor at Duke, because an old student of mine is now Chair of the Philosophy Department, and Duke does not engage in such nonsense as changing people's passwords. So I was able to get onto J-STOR through the Duke library system and carry out the downloads.
One odd tidbit. My vita tells me that the Nozick article appears in Volume 20 in 1978, but it seems that in fact the piece appears in volume 19 in 1977. I wonder how on earth I managed to get that wrong.
Wednesday, April 20, 2011
ALL DONE
NIFTY NEWS
Tuesday, April 19, 2011
A TRIP TO THE CIRCUS
I first started paying attention to presidential election campaigns in 1948, which, if I have counted correctly, is seventeen campaigns in all, including the one on which we are now embarked. In all that time, I have never seen anything as loony as what is now going on in the Republican Party. In view of the state of the economy, this ought to be a cycle in which the Republicans have a serious chance of defeating Obama, for all that he is far and away the most skillful politician and most effective campaigner currently on the political scene. It will come as no surprise that I have a low opinion of people like Romney, Pawlenty, Huntsman, Barbour, and Daniels, but they certainly, by current American standards, as "serious" candidates, and under the right conditions, which includes unstinting support from their own party, one or another of them could make a pretty decent run against Obama.
The Republicans get beside themselves with rage and loathing when they think of Obama. So what do they do? They find every way that the most imaginative satirist could dream up to keep any of those possible candidates from gaining traction in the run up to the nomination season. I feel as though I were watching the old Barnum & Bailey Three Ring Circus, in which a miniature car drives into the middle of the center ring, and then disgorges one clown after another. No sooner has one bulbous nosed slap-footed character been dispatched from the center of the spotlight by a swift kick to the keester than another pops out of the car and starts screaming, to the cheers and laughter of the crowd.
For a while Palin sucked up all the air, until she passed her buy-by date, and began to fade into Fox heaven. Romney poked his nose up, sniffed the wind, and was about the make his move when Bachman popped out of the clown car and began her special brand of crazy. That pretty much consigned Romney, Pawlenty, and crew to the side rings, where they did a few half-hearted back flips and handstands just to stay in practice. But a little Bachman goes a long way, so even she started to sound dated. Time for the heavyweights? Not a bit of it. The biggest clown of all, complete with a comb over from hell, unfolds himself from the little car and parades around the center ring, declaring to one and all that since his net worth is "many many times" that of Romney, he and no one else should get to be fired out of a cannon into the net.
Meanwhile, Obama, whatever you think of him, just stands there acting like a grown-up, heeding Napoleon's advice not to interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake. I freely confess that it is all fun, but then I really liked the circus when I was a kid. Maybe the Republicans have decided to test the old maxim that "you can't beat someone with no one." At this moment, despite giving the matter a good deal of thought, I cannot figure out how any of these Bozos is going to actually secure the nomination.
A REPLY TO MARINUS
Marinus Ferreira sent me a long interesting e-mail message criticizing my treatment of the Prisoner's Dilemma in Part Five of my tutorial on The Use and Abuse of Formal Methods in Political Philosophy, originally posted seriatim on my second blog, and now to be found on box.net. I should like to attempt a reply, and he has graciously given me permission to reproduce his entire e-mail message as part of that reply. Here it is:
Dear Prof Wolff,
As you posted the link to the archived form of your formal methods tutorial, you made a comment about the prisoner's dilemma in line with your dismissive appraisal of it in the tutorial. Forgive me if I bring up a tiresome topic, but I thought the appraisal was somewhat too
curt. When I was originally reading the tutorial, as you were posting it, I was surprised to see no mention about how prisoner dilemma cases show a tension between utility-maximization and Pareto-optimality. I believe investigating that tension, given as it is between two features of decision-making many people take to be bedrock parts of rationality (though neither you nor I would be in that camp, I'd wager) is sufficient reason to pay some attention to the prisoner's
dilemma. I wrote a comment on the recent post to that effect, except I got somewhat carried away (I blame the rainy weather) and what I wrote became somewhat too large for a comment on a blog post. I posted a slightly longer and dollied-up version of this on my own blog, but
since it is something I came up with in response to what you have said, I thought I would involve you in the discussion.
Contrary to your harsh evaluation, I think there is something to be said for the prisoner's dilemma as an analytic tool. Heaven knows a lot of people make ridiculous claims regarding it (for instance, I was told once that it shows that ethics is impossible), but there are at least two reasons to take it seriously, if only as an analytical device.
The first reason is that there are simply so many theoretically interesting cases which can be modeled as some variation of the PD, that is, where situations arise with the payout matrix I described above. There are traveler's dilemmas, the centipede game, the ultimatum game, etc. I'll leave it up to the reader to investigate these cases, and their link to the PD, on their own. But note that understanding any situation which can be modeled in this way is going to necessitate understanding the implications of the PD (which includes, as you stress, knowing what it doesn't entail).
Secondly, the most important reason to look at the PD (which I was surprised to see get no mention at all in the tutorial) is that it gives a very embarrassing and problematic result for the mass of people who believe that decision theory, etc., provide the gold standard for human reasoning. That is, the PD shows that utility maximization doesn't lead to Pareto-optimal situations (which was a bit of a surprise, since under similar suppositions the free market,
which is driven entirely by utility-maximization, does lead to Pareto-optimal distributions of resources – a bit more on that later in this paragraph). Utility maximization is the procedure whereby at each point you need to make a procedure you take whatever course of action has the best prospects for getting you what you want (after taking into consideration all the likely future effects of your actions), and Pareto-optimality is the idea that one situation is preferable to another if every person involved finds the first one to be at least as good as the latter. In non-wonk terms, the PD demonstrates that if everybody tries at every step to take the action with consequences they'd most prefer, they are quite likely to end up in a situation they find less preferable than one they would have reached had they acted differently. It in fact does even more, in that the situation of the two prisoners if both defect is worse for both of them, whereas it's Pareto-suboptimal if only one person reaches a situation they don't prefer. This is embarrassing and problematic to the decision theorist, because Pareto-optimality is a very low bar indeed. There are a range of terrible situations that are Pareto-optimal – for instance, a fiefdom with its range of landlords and impoverished serfs is a Pareto-optimal distribution of land, since to give any land to a serf you need to take it away from a landlord, which means that changing the distribution of land would always be against the preferences of at least one person. If utility-maximization can't even ensure reaching situations with that low level of goodness, then the decision theorist has reason to worry.
It's this feature of the PD which gives force to the tragedy of the commons (as George Hardin described in the 60s, though not as a PD). Each member of a community who tends sheep and has access to the common pasture always has the incentive to put one more sheep in the field: though this lowers the total productivity of the commons through being overloaded, the individual's gains of having the extra sheep outweigh the marginal loss to each sheep. But if everybody follows this incentive (as utility-maximization demands) then the commons will soon be exhausted and every farmer will be worse off in the end. The lesson to be learn here isn't that co-operation in such situations is impossible (as some people bizarrely claim, showing off a staggering confusion about the structure of human purposive action) but that utility-maximization – the hard-nosed pragmatism which makes the prisoner defect every time – is untenable as a general guide to action. In scenarios with PD pay-offs (and the insights of the
countless writers on this topic indicate just how many there might be) utility-maximization turns out to lead us by the nose to our downfall. And that is what we should learn from the prisoner's dilemma.
Sincerely yours,
Marinus
Let me say, first of all, that the continuing occurrence of really classy responses like this one to my blog posts is a source of great satisfaction to me. From time to time, I check the comments on one or another of the political blogs I read, and they are just not in the same league with this and many other responses I have received.
My first reply to Marinus is that it had simply never occurred to me to construe the Prisoner's Dilemma as a devastating critique of rational choice theory, but I certainly like the intention. I do not think that is the intention of the great majority of authors who invoke it, at least so far as I can tell, but as Marinus seems to suggest, that is their problem, not ours.
One technical point, which is not at all unimportant, needs to be made. Maximization of expected utility is a rule widely proposed and endorsed for the making of decisions under risk -- that is to say, as I explain in my tutorial, it is intended for situations in which the totality of the possible outcomes of an action is known and also the probability of each [so that the sum of the probabilities is 1.] But Game Theory, which is the locus of the Prisoner's Dilemma, is an analysis of choice under uncertainty -- that is to say, of situations in which the totality of the possible outcomes is known, the participant's ordinal ranking of those outcomes is known, the actions available to oneself and all other participants are known, and the precise outcome associated with each set of possible strategies of the game in the normal form is known, but in which the probabilities of the occurrence of the several outcomes is not known [hence "under uncertainty."]
Now, Marinus' central point, if I understand him correctly, is that if Rational Choice Theory cannot yield a satisfactory answer to the problem of choice in so reduced and elementary a situation as is modeled by the Prisoner's Dilemma, then that fact constitutes a powerful criticism of Rational Choice Theory. But Rational Choice Theory is a theory of choice under risk, not of choice under uncertainty. So despite my sympathy for the intention of the critique, I think it misses its mark.
Marinus is exactly right that Pareto Optimality is a very weak constraint indeed. And I agree the formalization of choice situations is useful in helping us to think through what is involved in them [such as the tragedy of the Commons, etc.]
When one gets into the precise detail of Game Theory, as elaborated by von Neumann, one quickly realizes that his enormously powerful and really elegant Fundamental Theorem applies only to a very, very constrained class of cases. What is perhaps most interesting is that once one moves beyond situations of two players with strictly opposed preference orders [The Prisoner's Dilemma is an instance of a game in which the players do not have strictly opposed preference orders], then, as Thomas Schelling first showed in his brilliant book, The Strategy of Conflict, all manner of informal considerations become essential to an analysis of bargaining situations. In my irreverent critique of the Prisoner's Dilemma, I was trying to make clear some of those essential but difficult to formalize considerations.
Monday, April 18, 2011
INTERESTING QUESTION
Marinus sent me a long, very interesting email message, criticizing my dismissive attitude toward the Prisoner's Dilemma in Part Five of my tutorial on Formal Methods in Political Philosophy. I am turning that over in my mind, and will reply in a bit. But out of curiosity, I Google'd him, and found my way to an interesting thread of comments on Brian Leiter's well-known blog [http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/] to which he had made a contribution.
Almost a year ago, Leiter started a lengthy discussion about which ten philosophers writing in English in the last third of the twentieth century will still be read a hundred years from now. I paged through a good many of the comments entered in the discussion [no, my name does not appear anywhere], and all the usual suspects showed up in the various lists -- Rawls, Quine, Davidson, Kripke, Lewis, Parfitt, etc., etc., etc., but after a while it occurred to me that virtually all the contributors were going about things the wrong way.
The first question to be asked is this: What sort of discipline do you think contemporary Anglo-American philosophy is? I think it is fair to say that there is a wide and growing belief especially among young analytic philosophers that philosophy, at long last, has graduated from being a humanistic discipline to being something very like science, with an admirable rigor, a sub-division of specializations, and a steady advance of well-confirmed discoveries. I don't myself share this view of philosophy, but then I have really been out of the game for more than a third of a century, so my opinion does not count.
If this is what you think philosophy is, then it is almost certain that in a hundred years none of the people proposed for the list will still be read seriously. Think about it. How many century-old papers in Physics or Biology or Chemistry [never mind Bio-Chemistry, a relatively new discipline] are read by practicing members of those disciplines? Maybe physicists out of piety read Einstein's annus mirabilis papers from 1905, but surely that is about the long and short of it. If analytic philosophy really has become what Kuhn called normal science, then what is being written now will be incorporated into twenty-second century philosophy, its authors all but forgotten. In Economics, whose practitioners like to flatter themselves that they are scientists because they use undergraduate math [calculus and linear algebra, with some statistics thrown in], Smith and Ricardo are honored only on Saint's Days, and even Menger, Walras, Jevons, Marshall, and Schumpeter are consigned to secondary courses on the history of the subject.
However, if you really think anyone will be reading Davidson or Lewis or Quine or Kripke or Rawls or [substitute your favorite here] in a century, it can only be because you think philosophy is, after all, a humanistic undertaking that grapples with the eternal questions of human existence and meaning, and hence flourishes by remembering its past and reading the texts that have stood the test of time.
Once you start thinking in that way, the question becomes quite complex, and it is not at all obvious who, if anyone, should be put on the list. [I say "if anyone" because looked at that way, philosophy exhibits long stretches, more than a century in many cases, during which nothing terribly memorable is written, and whether this is one of those down times remains to be seen.] I am reminded that Cicero, for example, was held in very high regard in the eighteenth century, even though today he is viewed [rightly in my opinion] as a thoroughly second-rate thinker. And I am afraid we all know what Hume said about his own Treatise, arguably the finest piece of philosophy every written in the English language.
