My Stuff

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Coming Soon:

The following books by Robert Paul Wolff are available on Amazon.com as e-books: KANT'S THEORY OF MENTAL ACTIVITY, THE AUTONOMY OF REASON, UNDERSTANDING MARX, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS, THE POVERTY OF LIBERALISM, A LIFE IN THE ACADEMY, MONEYBAGS MUST BE SO LUCKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE USE OF FORMAL METHODS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.
Now Available: Volumes I, II, III, and IV of the Collected Published and Unpublished Papers.

NOW AVAILABLE ON YOUTUBE: LECTURES ON KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. To view the lectures, go to YouTube and search for "Robert Paul Wolff Kant." There they will be.

NOW AVAILABLE ON YOUTUBE: LECTURES ON THE THOUGHT OF KARL MARX. To view the lectures, go to YouTube and search for Robert Paul Wolff Marx."





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Friday, October 3, 2014

CLARENCE IRVING LEWIS


WallyVerr asked me to say something about Clarence Irving Lewis [C. I. Lewis, as he is usually known] and I am more than happy to do so, but though I have many stories to tell about Lewis from my undergraduate days at Harvard -- some of which I have told in my Autobiography -- I am less well-equipped than many to speak knowledgeably about his enduring place in American philosophy.  I would be delighted if Charles Parsons would write something about Lewis, and maybe Warren Goldfarb, who is rather younger than I, might want to chime in.

I am going to stifle my natural impulse to pour out stories about Lewis, and confine myself in this brief post to some remarks about his philosophical career and his place in American philosophy.  If anyone really wants stories, I will be happy to comply in a later post.

Lewis was born in Massachusetts in 1883 and took both his B. A. and his doctorate in philosophy at Harvard.  After teaching for nine years at the University of California, he returned to the Harvard Department and taught there until his retirement in 1953 -- my senior year.  It was my immense good fortune to be able to take all three of the courses he taught in that last year -- an undergraduate course on Epistemology, a graduate seminar on Epistemology, and the famous Kant course, in which I began my serious study of the Critique of Pure Reason.  Although I studied with Willard van Orman Quine and Nelson Goodman and Morton White and Hao Wang and Harry Austryn Wolfson and a number of other first-rate philosophers, it was Lewis more than anyone else who gave me an enduring image of what it means to be a philosopher.  In his reserved, formal, late-Victorian way, he managed to communicate to all of us that it is not merely intellectually desirable but morally imperative to achieve clarity and fidelity to the truth of ideas in one's work.  I think it is fair to say that I have spent the sixty-one years since he retired striving to be true to that calling.

American philosophy has always been parasitic on its European lineage.  As far back as Locke's New Way of Ideas, American philosophers have followed the lead of European authors.  Continental Rationalism, British Empiricism, Social Contract Theory, Utilitarianism, Kantian Critical Philosophy, German Idealism, Romanticism, Logical Positivism, Ordinary Language Philosophy, Existentialism, Phenomenology all were European imports.  There has really been only one school of Philosophy that arose in the United States -- Pragmatism.  And among the important figures in the creation and development of that movement -- William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, John Dewey -- C. I. Lewis was, in my judgment, the best of them.  Lewis was a logician who trained Quine and many others coming through the Harvard Department in the first half of the twentieth century.  He was an epistemologist, and in his later years he was an ethicist as well. 

Lewis published a number of books, the most ambitious of which was An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation [1946].  One tiny story [I cannot resist].    In his very last semester at Harvard, the Spring semester of 1953, Lewis taught a seminar on epistemology, which I took.  At the last meeting of the seminar, he brought into class a number of books for which he had no further need -- presentation copies and such -- and invited each student to select one as a gift from him.  My graduate student classmates grabbed copies of the latest works to come from English philosophers and others, but I saw a copy of An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation and dove for it.  Lewis inscribed each book to the student who had chosen it, and so it is that my copy of Analysis is inscribed by the author himself.

Although Lewis may have intended Analysis to be the work for which he would be remembered, I think that his greatest work was Mind and the World Order, published in 1929.  It is, I truly believe, the best piece of philosophy ever written by an American.  I might describe it in shorthand as a marriage of Kant and Pragmatism as filtered through Lewis' understanding of formal logic.  It is not a difficult book to read, and in its elegant simplicity and clarity it is a true philosophical classic. 

I think that is as much as I wish to say about Lewis, but as I indicated, I would be delighted if any of my readers who feel up to the challenge would like to write something more extended and detailed about Lewis' philosophical achievements.

A BANNER DAY

Google tells me that there have been 7,500 published comments on this blog.  That is quite a conversation!

Thursday, October 2, 2014

CLEAR EVIDENCE OF A MISSPENT OLD AGE


The various solitaire programs on my computer keep track of how I do, and this morning, as I played my four thousand two hundred and twenty-second game of old-fashioned solitaire [on this computer], I paused to look over my record.  My win percentage is 16%, or, more precisely, 16.6%, which is almost exactly one in six.   [Interesting aside:  A while back I decided to start using the un-do facility to see whether I could up my win percentage.  Contrary to expectations, it has had no effect at all on the number of games I win.  Odd.]

My longest win streak is five.  Simple math tells me that I have a 1 in 7776 chanced of winning five games in a row, assuming that I always play with the same degree of skill and that the computer is not deliberately feeding me easy or hard games.  Since I have played 4,222 games in all, there have been 4,218 five-game runs, so one run of five wins is not out of line with expectations.  My longest loss streak during the same period of time is 54.  [I should report that as the losses piled up, I became morbidly curious just how long I would go without a win.]  Slightly more tedious math tells me that there is a 6.6 in 10,000 chance of a run of fifty-four losses, making the same assumptions.  This is a chance of roughly 1 in 1515.   Now, there are 4,168 fifty-four game runs in the 4,222 games I have played, so one run of fifty-four losses is well within the expectable.  [My gut tells me there is something wrong with this reasoning.  I was never any good at probabilities.  Do I have this right?]

NAME THAT TUNE


As I was sitting in my office having a first cup of decaf before taking my morning walk, I heard the radio in the kitchen, playing the local classical music station [WCRP -- a gem!  I wish France had something like it.]  After a brief pause, there was a blaring G played by trumpet, horns, reeds, and strings, and the thought popped unbidden into my head "The Mikado."  Sure enough, it was the unmistakable faux Japanese theme that introduces arguably the greatest of the Gilbert and Sullivan operettas.

No sooner had I performed this feat of instant identification than I called to mind the old TV show Name That Tune, which premiered when I was in college and returned in several iterations in the following decades.  For those of you too young or too refined to have watched it, this was a game show in which two contestants competed to see which one could name a tune faster after hearing the opening notes.  There was a special bonus round in which the contestants bid for a chance to name a tune after a specified number of notes:  "I can name that tune in three notes."  "I can name it in two notes."  If you won the bid and then failed to name the tune, your opponent won the round.

The mystery tunes were all drawn from the pop literature, of course, but I have often thought over the years that it would be great fun to play a classical music version.  Everyone of course recognizes Beethoven's Fifth Symphony from the first four notes [dah dah dah daaaah], but it is actually remarkable how many great works across the centuries are easily identifiable after only a very few notes -- maybe not many one can spot after one note, as I did The Mikado, but many surely after one bar of music. 

I would be terrible at the game, not because I would not recognize the music, but because I would most likely have a senior moment and be unable to put a name to it.  This morning, during my walk, I thought about this post, and it took me almost the entire walk to remember the word "Overture."  I thought "The Prelude to The Mikado?  No.  The Introduction to The Mikado?  No.  The Preface to The Mikado?  No."  Finally in desperation I thought "the William Tell ---" and the word "Overture" popped into my head.  [I was a big fan of the Lone Ranger as a kid.]

Now we just need a sponsor.

Wednesday, October 1, 2014

A HAPPY THOUGHT IN A REALLY TERRIBLE WORLD

Mark Harmon, who plays Special Agent Leroy Jethro Gibbs on NCIS [one of my favorite shows] has been married for twenty-seven years to Pam Dawber, who played Mindy on Mork and Mindy, the show that gave Robin Williams his start.

COMMENTS ON COMMENTS


My recent posts have provoked a stream of quite interesting comments, which as yet I have not responded to, so rather than reply in the comments section, I have decided to write an omnium gatherum post in which I try to address some of the many questions that have been raised.

Let me begin with two comments [or rather three, actually], by Andrew Blais and Warren Goldfarb, that take me back quite a way to my early days as student and young Instructor, in the 1950's and early 1960's.  Andrew Blais asks me some pointed questions about my relation to Quine's nominalism and whether it is in any way related to my oft-expressed belief that we must struggle to translate metaphors into arguments if we are to make them clear.  My initial reaction to this question was that I had never been much interested in the Nominalism-Platonism debate and thought that it had no impact at all on my thinking about Philosophy.  But then I recalled Martin Jay's wonderful account in The Dialectical Imagination of his interviews with the surviving members of the Frankfurt School for Social Research.  Jay asked some of the leading members of the School, who had sought refuge in America from Nazism [many at the New School for Social Research in Manhattan], what significance there might be in the fact that almost all of them were upper middle class assimilated German Jews.  These were folks -- Herbert Marcuse, Hannah Arendt, Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm, et al. -- who were capable of discerning deep ideological resonances and complexities in the unlikeliest artifacts of popular culture, and yet they all brushed the question aside and said there was no significance to it at all.

Now, I studied with Quine and Goodman when I was not yet eighteen years old.  How plausible is it that I was blithely unaffected by the philosophical issue that at that time completely absorbed them?  Good grief, my first serious college term paper, written my Freshman year, was a "Calculus of Size" using Nelson Goodman's nominalist Logic of Individuals as it was set forth in his first book, The Structure of Appearance.  Would I believe Aristotle if he said he had been uninfluenced by studying with Plato?  Or Marx, if he said that although Hegel might have been in the air in Berlin, he had not inhaled?

Quine was meticulous about the niceties of formal logic in a way that he thought mathematicians were not.  I imbibed the distinction between use and mention with my mother's milk, as it were.  So, if I may view myself objectively, it seems indisputable that I was influenced by whatever Quine, Goodman, and certain other members of the Harvard Philosophy Department [most notably C. I. Lewis] thought were the important philosophical questions.  I can recall vividly staying up all night puzzling over the analytic/synthetic distinction and rushing into the Adams House dining room on Sunday morning to tell Stanley Cavell what I had discovered, only to be dismissed by Stanley and his guest, poet John Hollander, with the languid remark, "Please, not before breakfast."

There can be no doubt that my conception of clarity comes directly from that handful of analytic philosophers with whom I studied as a boy, even if the formal issue of nominalism was never on my mind.

Blais goes on to ask, "Why is it that all the great philosophers (the ones that you have explicated, for example) have all left posterity complicated argumentative structures that rest on metaphors that need so much effort to explain?"  I think I know the answer to that one.  The very greatest philosophers are never content with neat, precise superficial explications of reasonably transparent questions.  They are constantly struggling to put into words insights they have, sometimes only dimly, into very deep and complex questions, the articulation of which forces them beyond whatever is the received and widely understood state of the art when they are working.  They are unwilling to let go of those insights, even if they are not yet able to state them clearly.  So they grasp at metaphorical articulations that keep alive as much as possible of the insights.  Sometimes they are then able to restate those insights clearly and precisely, but often it is left to us, coming after them, to do that work.  But if they are so brilliant, why can they not do this themselves?  I will answer with a metaphor.  When I was young, the four minute mile was the unattainable goal of every world-class long distance runner.  Finally, in 1954 [as I was preparing to take the famously formidable Prelims in the Harvard Philosophy Department] Roger Bannister broke the four minute barrier in a race at Oxford University.  Pretty soon, all the great runners were running sub-four minute miles, and these days good high school runners can do it.  But until John Bannister did it, it seemed impossible.

Which, by a process of Shandean association, brings me to Warren Goldfarb's interesting response to my facetious post about first and last lines.  Professor Goldfarb writes that "in the late 1950s J.L. Austin and my late colleague Roderick Firth were planning a book of opposing views in epistemology that they hoped to title Price and Prejudice (after H.H. Price, the stalwart of English sense-data theory)."   The late 1950's is just when I was writing my doctoral dissertation under Firth's direction and teaching in the Department as an Instructor when Firth was acting as Chair.   I never heard about the plan for a book with Austin, but I can easily imagine it.  Roderick Firth was a wonderful man -- ramrod straight, slender, a man of impeccable moral character, with a charming little smile flirting with the edges of his mouth.  I heard that as a Quaker he "witnessed" during the Viet Nam War by attending public demonstrations.  It was Firth who gave me an invaluable little piece of advice on writing my dissertation.  He put a pair of x and y axes on the board and then drew two lines -- a straight line rising slowly from the origin, and an arc curving up from the origin farther and farther above the straight line.  "The straight line is your ability to write a good dissertation, rising slowly as time passes," he said.  "The curved line represents the sort of dissertation you think you should write, and as time passes and you do not finish, it rises faster and faster.  The sooner you finish, the smaller the gap will be between the dissertation you do write and the dissertation you think you should write."  It was the best advice I ever received, and I responded by writing the entire dissertation, from the time I chose the topic until the day I handed it in, in eighteen months.

My first year as a graduate student, I took a reading course with Firth.  I read Hastings Rashdall's Theory of Good and Evil and Henry Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics and Collingwood and Moore and Ross and Ewing and lord knows what else.  I am sure I am a better person for it all, but I found it hopelessly boring.  I actually went off to Europe for my wanderjahr thinking I would write a dissertation on ethics, but by the time I got home, I had given that up and turned instead to Kant and Hume.  Whew!  Close call.

Professor Goldfarb mentions H. H. Price.  How that brings back memories!  Price's book, Hume's Theory of the External World, now long forgotten I am sure, had an enormous impact on me during the time when I was so deeply engaged with the Treatise.  Those were the days when Oxford and Cambridge were the Promised Land to American philosophers.  It is all associated in my mind with those severe black volumes that Oxford University Press put out, many of which still grace my shelves here in Chapel Hill.

Which  brings me to Andrew Levine, my old student, now retired [I believe.]  I have not yet gotten around to reading Andy's book on Marx, which I shall, so I must hold serious comment for the moment, but I could not let his name pass without noting that for a brief moment [his "fifteen minutes of fame," pace Andy Warhol], he was known on television as Professor Backwards because of his bizarre ability [demonstrated, if I remember correctly, on the Johnny Carson Show] to repeat what someone says backwards -- not word by word, but phoneme by phoneme, so that it sounds like what a person who does not speak Chinese thinks Chinese sounds like.

Well, I think that is enough, though it only scratches the surface of the interesting comments that have popped up lately.  Thank you all and keep them coming.

THE MYSTERIES OF THE HIGHER SCHOLARSHIP

I have just had a fascinating e-mail message from Juan Carlos Boué, Senior Research Fellow in Oxford University's Institute for Energy Studies, where he is also studying Jurisprudence.  Sr. Boué was for a time a very highly placed advisor to the Venezuelan government on petroleum policy, until, as he put it in an earlier e-mail to me, he acquired a reputation as a dangerous agitator.   His purpose in writing this time was to send me a copy  of an article he has just published entitled "Enforcing Pacta Sunt Servanda?  Conoco-Phillips and Exxon-Mobil Versus the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela."  On page 28 of this article, Sr. Boué writes "Sigmund Freud once wrote, referring to the process of psychoanalysis, that if any particular subject is not allowed to be discussed freely in an analysis, sooner or later the entire analysis will be about that particular subject."  Although he does not footnote me, he tells me in his e-mail message that my Autobiography is indeed the source of this claim, even though I admitted that it might be apocryphal.  He notes that it got past the editors, so presumably it is now an established tidbit of scholarly truth. 

This puts me in mind of two stories that I believe I have told elsewhere.  The first, which should be filed under the heading stare decisis, concerns a delightful moment of my brief tenure as an Instructor in the Harvard Philosophy Department.  During all eleven years of my stay at Harvard, first as an undergraduate, then as a graduate student, and finally as a member of the faculty, the Philosophy Department was presided over by a wonderful woman named Ruth Allen who had, I believe, served as departmental secretary for so long that she could remember Willard van Orman Quine when he was a graduate student.  During one of the very infrequent Department meetings, a procedural question arose, and someone was sent to ask Ms. Allen whether what we wanted to do comported with university regulations.  She said it did.  When asked for some justification of this judgment she cited a decision she herself had made many years earlier.  Stare decisis.

The second story concerns a wonderful experiment in animal psychology that I heard about from someone or other and took to reporting in my lectures at UMass.  According to the account, some researcher had performed the following experiment:  Chimpanzees like bananas and hate cold water [or so the story goes].  The researcher took a group of chimps and withheld food from them until they were good and hungry [this was before various federal laws had been enacted concerning the treatment of laboratory animals].  She then released them from their cages into a central area where there were bunches of bananas.  The chimps rushed the bananas, but as soon as they reached them they were doused with freezing water.  The researcher kept this up until the chimps became adversely conditioned to the sight and smell of bananas, shrinking from what had been their favorite food.  At this point, one of the conditioned chimps was replaced with a new chimp, but when he rushed for the bananas, the other chimps pulled him away, afraid of being hit with the freezing water.  Eventually, the new chimp also became adversely conditioned to bananas, even though he had no idea why [never having been hit with the freezing water.]  One by one, the orignal chimps were replaced by new chimps, who were conditioned in the same way, until the entire group consisted of chimps who shrank from their favorite food without knowing why.  This I took as an allegory of the establishment of organized religion.  One day, I received a call from a student editor at the Yale Law Journal.  An author [apparently my former student] had submitted an article in which this story was told, with a footnote to me as the source, and the editors [more careful than the editors of the Journal of International Dispute Settlement] wanted to know my source for the story.  I confessed that I had no source, and thought the story might be apocryphal, whereupon they edited it out of the submitted article. 

What wisdom can we draw from these tales?  Each of us must make his or her own judgment, of course, but what they have taught me is that if you live long enough, you can become, if not a legend in your own mind, at least an authority in your own time.