1. JR, I would be very interested in taking a look at those papers. Are they accessible on-line, at least for reading if not downloading? I have access to journals on-line through Duke.
2. Timothy, first help me out. What is the "metaphysical argument for induction" that is now thought to be successful? I am a little bit clueless. My account of Kant's reply to Hume is in Kant's Theory of Mental Activity. Indeed, most of the book is devoted to explicating that reply. Once I know what I am talking about, I will craft a response.
As for how Kant can handle the first problem, my complete account is in The Autonomy of Reason: A Commentary to the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals [don't you hate it when people keep referring you to their own books? Like they think nothing else exists in the world!]
The brief story is this: Kant is a strict determinist of the old school. As Laplace famously wrote, "We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes."
Which means that it is for Kant [and for Laplace] impossible for the noumenal self to step into the flow of events and by an act of free will re-direct that flow, choosing, let us say, not to kill someone even though the forces of nature have determined from time immemorial that [the phenomenal appearance of] that noumenal self will commit murder.
However, according to Kant in the First Critique, the mind is "the lawgiver to nature." The causal laws that it finds in nature it has, through its own synthesizing activity, placed there. And time itself is merely one of the two forms in which things appear to us sensibly, not a characteristic of things in themselves.
Which means [this is the strictly consistent but incredible part] that the noumenal self can, when it synthesizes the entire world order, choose to synthesize it in such a manner that it [or its appearance in the realm of phenomena] obeys the Moral Law rather than violates it.
Which perhaps helps to explain why Kant is so much more interested in universal moral principles whose bindingness on us is knowable a priori and not so interested in individual in situ moral choices [although of course, since he wrote about everything, he wrote about that too.]