A Commentary on the Passing Scene by
Robert Paul Wolff
rwolff@afroam.umass.edu
Thursday, March 7, 2019
IT'S UP
Okay, nerds, the Rawls lecture is up on YouTube. You can find it here. Be the first one in your neighborhood to watch it. I think the best thing about it is Geoff Sayre-McCord's intro. He is a prince!
I think there are some problems with Rawls's argument (at least as presented in the '71 ed. of TJ, which was not of course his last word on the matter) about how the chooser would decide under the original position, but I don't think one needs an elaborate game-theoretic critique to see this. The nub of the problem that you seem to be pointing at is that there is no esp. compelling reason to think people in the original position will be as risk-averse as Rawls supposes. Some people, even not knowing anything about themselves, may still gamble that they will turn out to be the "advantaged" ones in terms of natural abilities, social circumstances, etc etc. They would be willing to accept a less egalitarian overall outcome on the chance that they'll end up toward the top of the distribution. They are gamblers, in other words. Rawls thinks this kind of gambling is irrational, but is it?
This point (the one I just sketched) is, I think, one that a number of Rawls's critics have made, but it has to do more with his assumptions about psychology and the prevalence or "rationality" of risk-aversive behavior under certain conditions than with the arcana of game theory. You don't need to talk about outcome matrixes, strategies, and all that to make this point.
Rawls writes (p. 153, '71 ed.) that he he has described the original position "so that it is rational for the parties to adopt the conservative [i.e., risk-averse] attitude expressed by this [the maximin] rule..." Well, it's rational on a certain definition of "rationality" that equates rationality with caution and risk aversion. In other words, the main problem in this part of the argument seems to be Rawls's definition of "rationality" and his underestimation of the human propensity and willingness to take risks and to gamble, and that point can be made without any reference to John von Neumann and game theory. For me, at any rate, the game-theory elaboration really doesn't add much to the basic point here.
I notice that there is a long article in the Stanford Ency. of Philosophy on the original position, written by Rawls's former student Samuel Freeman, presumably defending Rawls vs criticisms. I'm not inclined to wade through it right now but I mention it in case someone else might be.
LFC's comment is quite helpful. I'll add a bit, noting that I haven't watched the lecture. (Not for substantive reasons - I just find watching philosophy lectures on computer very difficult. This makes me feel bad, as my current employer believes that recorded lectures are the way of the future, so most students don't actually come to class. But I digress...)
The argument that LFC notes is a fairly common one, made by John Harsanyi and David Gauthier, among others (although to slightly different ends.) (There is a very good discussion of this and related arguments in an article By Gerald Gauss and John Thrasher in the fairly recent volume, _The Original Position_, edited by Timothy Hinton. Bob's work gets a bit of discussion in this paper.)
An important part of Rawls's argument here is that, to be stable (for the "right reasons"), any agreement would have to be such that those who decide on it could willingly live with it after the veil is lifted. This is part of the so-called "strains of commitment" argument. It's often left out in discussion of the original position, but it's an essential element for understanding the argument. I think it works quite well to show why the parties wouldn't accept anything like our current society (or worse), or even the unconstrained principle of utility. What is much harder is showing that a constrained principle of utility, joined with a "decent social minimum" would be rejected. (After all, by definition, the "social minimum" is "decent", and so assumedly acceptable.) There are other arguments to support the two principles against this account, but they are, it must be admitted, more controversial. There's a good discussion of these issues in a paper by Jon Mandle, "The Choice from the Original Position", in Mandle and Reidy, eds., _A Companion to Rawls_ (Blackwell.)
Thanks Matt, interesting. N.b. In case people haven't figured this out, the Matt who just posted in this thread is a philosopher (and keeps up with, and contributes to, the literature on Rawls, among other subjects); I'm not a philosopher and don't follow most of the contemporary Rawls lit., so I always appreciate Matt's comments on this (and other things).
While my previous comment on Pr. Wolff's lecture was somewhat critical of the substance, I ought to have also said that I find his lectures easy to watch because they are -- as this one is -- well-prepared and well-delivered, with only an occasional glance at notes. The personal stories are sometimes simply entertaining digressions but sometimes contribute to the substantive points.
On the other hand, if someone finds philosophy lectures difficult to watch, my hunch/guess is that most everything of substance in this lecture can be found in Wolff's book on Rawls. Pr. Wolff clearly made up his mind on a lot of things a good while ago, and I doubt his views on Rawls have changed much if at all (though the mode of expression might have changed a bit -- I don't know for sure, since I haven't read his book on Rawls or earlier articles on Rawls).
One last thing: Wolff is clearly not a fan of Rawls's writing style, and on that particular point I tend to agree somewhat with Wolff, at least as far as TJ is concerned. I do *not* agree w Wolff that the book is a slender monograph hiding in a philosophical fatsuit, nor do I agree w Wolff that what he has called the book's "fretwork" is of no importance, but I do think it didn't have to be quite as long as it is. Maybe at some level Rawls came to agree with this, since Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, published toward the end of Rawls's life, is quite short.
Thank you very much, professor Wolff, I have been looking forward to your lecture ever since you've announced it.
ReplyDeleteExcellent; I'm very much looking forward to watching this lecture!
ReplyDeleteThank you, that was great!
ReplyDeleteI would have loved to see the discussion also.
Cheers,
trane
Thank your so much. So great!
ReplyDeletePS I have enjoyed your Kant lectures too and really helped me enter into the book without being overwhelmed. Eternally grateful.
I think there are some problems with Rawls's argument (at least as presented in the '71 ed. of TJ, which was not of course his last word on the matter) about how the chooser would decide under the original position, but I don't think one needs an elaborate game-theoretic critique to see this. The nub of the problem that you seem to be pointing at is that there is no esp. compelling reason to think people in the original position will be as risk-averse as Rawls supposes. Some people, even not knowing anything about themselves, may still gamble that they will turn out to be the "advantaged" ones in terms of natural abilities, social circumstances, etc etc. They would be willing to accept a less egalitarian overall outcome on the chance that they'll end up toward the top of the distribution. They are gamblers, in other words. Rawls thinks this kind of gambling is irrational, but is it?
ReplyDeleteThis point (the one I just sketched) is, I think, one that a number of Rawls's critics have made, but it has to do more with his assumptions about psychology and the prevalence or "rationality" of risk-aversive behavior under certain conditions than with the arcana of game theory. You don't need to talk about outcome matrixes, strategies, and all that to make this point.
Rawls writes (p. 153, '71 ed.) that he he has described the original position "so that it is rational for the parties to adopt the conservative [i.e., risk-averse] attitude expressed by this [the maximin] rule..." Well, it's rational on a certain definition of "rationality" that equates rationality with caution and risk aversion. In other words, the main problem in this part of the argument seems to be Rawls's definition of "rationality" and his underestimation of the human propensity and willingness to take risks and to gamble, and that point can be made without any reference to John von Neumann and game theory. For me, at any rate, the game-theory elaboration really doesn't add much to the basic point here.
Oops, that "anonymous" above at 12:54 a.m. was me. Sorry about the mis-identification.
ReplyDeleteI notice that there is a long article in the Stanford Ency. of Philosophy on the original position, written by Rawls's former student Samuel Freeman, presumably defending Rawls vs criticisms. I'm not inclined to wade through it right now but I mention it in case someone else might be.
ReplyDeleteLFC's comment is quite helpful. I'll add a bit, noting that I haven't watched the lecture. (Not for substantive reasons - I just find watching philosophy lectures on computer very difficult. This makes me feel bad, as my current employer believes that recorded lectures are the way of the future, so most students don't actually come to class. But I digress...)
ReplyDeleteThe argument that LFC notes is a fairly common one, made by John Harsanyi and David Gauthier, among others (although to slightly different ends.) (There is a very good discussion of this and related arguments in an article By Gerald Gauss and John Thrasher in the fairly recent volume, _The Original Position_, edited by Timothy Hinton. Bob's work gets a bit of discussion in this paper.)
An important part of Rawls's argument here is that, to be stable (for the "right reasons"), any agreement would have to be such that those who decide on it could willingly live with it after the veil is lifted. This is part of the so-called "strains of commitment" argument. It's often left out in discussion of the original position, but it's an essential element for understanding the argument. I think it works quite well to show why the parties wouldn't accept anything like our current society (or worse), or even the unconstrained principle of utility. What is much harder is showing that a constrained principle of utility, joined with a "decent social minimum" would be rejected. (After all, by definition, the "social minimum" is "decent", and so assumedly acceptable.) There are other arguments to support the two principles against this account, but they are, it must be admitted, more controversial. There's a good discussion of these issues in a paper by Jon Mandle, "The Choice from the Original Position", in Mandle and Reidy, eds., _A Companion to Rawls_ (Blackwell.)
Thanks Matt, interesting. N.b. In case people haven't figured this out, the Matt who just posted in this thread is a philosopher (and keeps up with, and contributes to, the literature on Rawls, among other subjects); I'm not a philosopher and don't follow most of the contemporary Rawls lit., so I always appreciate Matt's comments on this (and other things).
ReplyDeleteWhile my previous comment on Pr. Wolff's lecture was somewhat critical of the substance, I ought to have also said that I find his lectures easy to watch because they are -- as this one is -- well-prepared and well-delivered, with only an occasional glance at notes. The personal stories are sometimes simply entertaining digressions but sometimes contribute to the substantive points.
On the other hand, if someone finds philosophy lectures difficult to watch, my hunch/guess is that most everything of substance in this lecture can be found in Wolff's book on Rawls. Pr. Wolff clearly made up his mind on a lot of things a good while ago, and I doubt his views on Rawls have changed much if at all (though the mode of expression might have changed a bit -- I don't know for sure, since I haven't read his book on Rawls or earlier articles on Rawls).
One last thing: Wolff is clearly not a fan of Rawls's writing style, and on that particular point I tend to agree somewhat with Wolff, at least as far as TJ is concerned. I do *not* agree w Wolff that the book is a slender monograph hiding in a philosophical fatsuit, nor do I agree w Wolff that what he has called the book's "fretwork" is of no importance, but I do think it didn't have to be quite as long as it is. Maybe at some level Rawls came to agree with this, since Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, published toward the end of Rawls's life, is quite short.