A RESPONSE TO J. W. F.

J. W. F. has posted a lengthy and knowledgeable criticism of my post about Rawls, and I should like to respond.  Here is what J. W. F. wrote:

“One of the weaker aspects of Understanding Rawls was your decision to read Rawls’ argument for the difference principle in A Theory of Justice primarily in relation to the 1958 “Justice as Fairness” article. And while it may have seemed germane in the late seventies, it would now be highly idiosyncratic to do so. The final statement of the argument, of course, is the one presented in 2001’s Justice as Fairness: A Restatement.

I would also suggest, that it is clear (in light of the full Rawlsian corpus) that Rawls does not think the use of the maximin rule for choice under uncertainty is a knock-down argument for the difference principle; in part I of A Theory of Justice, the appeal to the maximin rule is used to vindicate the choice of a conception of justice that accepts the priority of liberty (the two principles of justice) over those that do not (classical utilitarianism and average utilitarianism).

Rawls came to see, and state more explicitly, that the primary competitor of justice as fairness (as he saw it) was not utilitarianism per se, but so-called “mixed conceptions” which accept the priority of liberty (or some suitable version of the first principle) but replace the difference principle with some form of restricted average utilitarianism. In chapter V of A Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that mixed conceptions, since they must set some social minimum, must rely on ad hoc considerations in order to do so; and, whatever principled basis might be used to set a social minimum might be just an unconscious application of the difference principle. In Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Rawls indicates that he is less impressed with this argument, but introduces considerations of publicity, reciprocity, and stability to argue that the difference principle would be chosen as the second principle rather than a principle of restricted average utility.

A further question turns on to what degree the difference principle is in fact a justification of inequality at all. On this score, chapter 4 of G. A. Cohen’s Rescuing Justice and Equality (“The Difference Principle”) is worth consulting. (The whole first half of the book, really.)”

Leaving aside the last paragraph [I have not read Cohen’s book], let me respond.  I find Rawls’ work interesting, insofar as I do, because I think the idea of trying to bridge the divide between utilitarianism and intuitionism by combining the social contract tradition with the methods of Game Theory is imaginative, indeed brilliant.  I do not find Rawls’ general discussion of social, economic, and political theoretical issues interesting or suggestive.  This is obviously a subjective response, not a balanced scholarly judgment.  All my work for the past sixty-five years or more has been guided by the same sorts of subjective considerations. 

From my point of view, Rawls' original idea, and its early development, is worth engaging with.  All the rest is, from my point of view, skillful, elaborate, rather tedious, and not worth engaging with.  It goes without saying that I do not for a moment suggest that anyone else has an intellectual obligation to follow me in these personal explorations of ideas I find interesting.

I do actually think, just as a matter of fact, that Rawls clung to his original idea through all the baroque elaborations, revisions, specifications, qualifications, and concessions that fill his writings, but as I said to him in a letter I wrote to him about a different matter, “You are the world’s leading authority on what you believe, so if you tell me you do not think that, of course I accept that as true.”  Thus if somewhere Rawls said, “Forget the device of the bargaining game – that was just a youthful jeu d’esprit and I renounce it,” then I would immediately acknowledge that I was wrong in thinking he clung to the original idea.

I realize this is not the way academics are accustomed to talking about someone’s writings, but it is my way, and at eighty-five, I am afraid it is too late to change.