^Hm, are we looking for philosophical treatments of "here"? I found one in everyone's favorite book, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. I'll just copy secs. 97 and 98. (A.V. Miller translation.)
"97. It is as a universal too that we utter what the sensuous [content] is. What we say is: 'This', i.e., the universal This; or, 'it is', i.e., Being in general. Of course, we do not envisage the universal This or Being in general, but we utter the universal; in other words, we do not strictly say what in this sense-certainty we mean to say. But language, as we see, is the more truthful; in it, we ourselves directly refute what we mean to say, and since the universal is the true [content] of sense-certainty and language expresses this true [content] alone, it is just not possible for us ever to say, or express in words, a sensuous being that we mean.
"98. The same will be the case with the other form of the 'This', with 'Here'. 'Here' is, e.g., the tree. If I turn round, this truth has vanished and is converted into its opposite: 'No tree is here, but a house instead'. 'Here' itself does not vanish; on the contrary, it abides constant in the vanishing of the house, the tree, etc., and is indifferently house or tree. Again, therefore, the 'This' shows itself to be a mediated simplicity, or a universality."
J.N. Findlay's paraphrase:
"97. In the use of demonstrative words there is a conflict between what we really say and what we mean to say (our Meinung, was wir meinen). We mean to express what is ultimately individual, but this is inexpressible; all we succeed in expressing is what is universal.
"98. The demonstrative 'Here' behaves exactly like the demonstrative 'Now', and always changes its application. It is therefore a case of pure universality. We cannot pin down the individual position qua individual, only individuality in general."
Any jest in your back pocket that you would like to share with us.... Anonymous?
ReplyDeletehttps://www.jstor.org/stable/30227158#:~:text=into%20the%20theory%20of%20demonstratives,actual'%20and%20'present'.
ReplyDelete^Hm, are we looking for philosophical treatments of "here"? I found one in everyone's favorite book, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. I'll just copy secs. 97 and 98. (A.V. Miller translation.)
ReplyDelete"97. It is as a universal too that we utter what the sensuous [content] is. What we say is: 'This', i.e., the universal This; or, 'it is', i.e., Being in general. Of course, we do not envisage the universal This or Being in general, but we utter the universal; in other words, we do not strictly say what in this sense-certainty we mean to say. But language, as we see, is the more truthful; in it, we ourselves directly refute what we mean to say, and since the universal is the true [content] of sense-certainty and language expresses this true [content] alone, it is just not possible for us ever to say, or express in words, a sensuous being that we mean.
"98. The same will be the case with the other form of the 'This', with 'Here'. 'Here' is, e.g., the tree. If I turn round, this truth has vanished and is converted into its opposite: 'No tree is here, but a house instead'. 'Here' itself does not vanish; on the contrary, it abides constant in the vanishing of the house, the tree, etc., and is indifferently house or tree. Again, therefore, the 'This' shows itself to be a mediated simplicity, or a universality."
J.N. Findlay's paraphrase:
"97. In the use of demonstrative words there is a conflict between what we really say and what we mean to say (our Meinung, was wir meinen). We mean to express what is ultimately individual, but this is inexpressible; all we succeed in expressing is what is universal.
"98. The demonstrative 'Here' behaves exactly like the demonstrative 'Now', and always changes its application. It is therefore a case of pure universality. We cannot pin down the individual position qua individual, only individuality in general."