A BRIEF RESPONSE TO A MULTI-PART COMMENT

No sooner had I lifted the moratorium then MS posted a three-part comment of considerable length. I really do not want to get into a discussion of whether the comments section of a blog is more like a dinner party or a town square but since the three-part comment was an extended discussion of my little book In Defense of Anarchism I feel called upon to respond.

 

Somewhat more than the first third of the comment is taken up by a series of quotations from the book. Then MS begins with what I must confess I found a rather puzzling paragraph. MS writes “Neither you nor I, nor any other readers of your blog, can know to what extent Trump’s actions are intended, in his mind, to maximize his autonomy, at the same time as conforming to what he regards as his moral imperative. Moreover, none of us can know that of anybody else.” My immediate response is: of course I can know that, either about Trump or about other people. I may in fact not know it because I lack sufficient information in this particular case, although quite frankly I think I have more than enough information about Trump to make a reasoned judgment about the matter. But unless one wants to embrace an extreme position with regard to what used to be called in philosophy “the problem of other minds,” it seems to me obvious that all of us go through life making judgments of this sort all the time about the intentions, beliefs, plans, desires, reasons for action, self justifications, self deceptions, and motivations of other people. Indeed, that is most of what we do in our social life.

 

It is clear that MS agrees with this because he begins own his discussion by saying  “I believe that I, as a sentient being, have an obligation to respect the needs and aspirations of other sentient beings – as long as those needs and aspirations also respect the needs and aspirations of other sentient beings, e.g., do not cause others pain, do not without legitimate justification (i.e., commission of a crime) deprive them of their physical freedom - and that this requires compromise and coordination, which in turn requires acceptance of the authority mutually reached through the exercise of compromise and coordination.” But if you think you have an obligation to respect the needs and aspirations of other sentient beings, then you obviously think you can know what those needs and aspirations are, and if you can know that, then why on earth cannot you also know the extent to which Trump’s actions, or those of anybody else, are intended to do this or that or the other thing. I mean, you cannot have it both ways.

 

MS then drifts off into a discussion that does not really engage at all with my argument regarding autonomy. My question in that extended essay was this: is there ever a de jure legitimate state, in the sense of a state whose commands I have some obligation to obey merely because they have been issued? My answer is quite simply, no. I go to some lengths in my little book to make it clear that this has nothing to do with the question whether in some circumstances – whether in fact in most circumstances – I have an independent moral obligation as an autonomous agent to conform myself to certain of the commands of those who claim legitimate authority because in my judgment my conforming to those commands is, taking everything into account, best. To give a deliberately trivial example, if I am driving on the roads of a country ruled by a group of people who claim – incorrectly on my view – to have legitimate authority, I will in most cases drive on whichever side of the road they command me to drive on because to do otherwise would put myself and other drivers in jeopardy and that, I judge, would be wrong of me.

 

My little book is so short that rather than rehearse its arguments I will simply suggest that anyone interested read it. All of this is so simple and straightforward that it need not be elaborated at great length but let me make one final observation. Perhaps I can tie it to one of my favorite quotations from Shakespeare, a line by Owen Glendower in Henry IV part one. The conspirators are making their plans and Glendower rather grandly says “I can call spirits from the vasty deep.” To which one of the characters replies “why so can I, and so can any man/but do they come when you do call them?” Trump or anyone can claim to be acting for the purpose of expanding or solidifying his or her autonomy. That by itself is not much of a response to an accusation of self-interest.

 

One final point. There are rules, which MS knows better than I, regulating what evidence must be placed into the record in a legal proceeding to establish motivation. There are also professional restrictions placed on psychiatrists regarding public speculations concerning the psychological condition of persons who are not their patients and whom indeed they have never met. But at least for 4 or 5 thousand years and probably for much longer, people have been making judgments about the motivations of others. I think it is perfectly sensible for them to do so and that has nothing whatsoever to do with the questions I discussed in my little book.

 

I hope this clears things up a bit but if not, I urge MS to restrain himself from extended  responses on this blog.