In responding to some interesting comments to my last post, I should like to take the opportunity to explore once again the subject that has troubled me for a long time and on which I have, I believe, commented a number of times on this blog. At the end of a suggestive comment, David G writes: “A third change: unlike 70 years ago, college now provides the necessary entry ticket into most good-paying jobs—I guess you could call that an "improvement"? That may be more of an explanation for tuition increases, though I don't think it explains the explosion in college tuition over the past 10–20 years.”
As I have several times observed, in 1950 when I first went
to college only 5% of adults in America had college degrees, which meant that
most of the positions in the economy that now require a college degree were
filled by people who did not have one. Today by way of contrast one third of
adults 26 years old and older have college degrees. I do not think one can
explain the change by some sort of dramatic upgrading of the skills and
training required by jobs these days. These days to get into a management
training position in a big corporation you need a Bachelor’s degree and
possibly also an MBA. Whatever it is you learn on the way to earning those
degrees, I seriously doubt that much of it is required to do well as a
management trainee.
Because of the steeply pyramidal structure of the modern
capitalist job world, with good salaries and good fringe benefits available in
only a minority of job openings, there is, inevitably, severe competition for
those relatively scarce good jobs. The result is credential creep and the
privileging of those whose credentials are acquired at a small number of “good”
schools. 51 years ago, in my little book The Ideal of the University I proposed
random admission to colleges and universities as a way both of eliminating the
pressure on elementary and high school students to get into the “good” schools
(which is to say schools that provide what David G calls the necessary entry
ticket into most good paying jobs) and of eliminating most if not all of the
advantage to be gained from securing one’s credential at an elite school. I
suspect the value of the credential from the elite school in contemporary
society, in combination with the variety of other things commenters mentioned,
explains a good deal of the soaring tuition price.
But that still leaves open the question why the job world
has the steeply pyramidal compensation structure that we see today. And this is
a question whose answer has been puzzling me for many years. Indeed, in the
essay The Future of Socialism which I wrote and never published some years ago,
I observed that Marx’s failure to anticipate this pyramidal structure was one
of his three big failures.
One obvious answer to the question is, I believe, clearly
wrong, namely that the higher pay of the good jobs is required to compensate
workers for the cost of acquiring the specialized skills demanded by those
jobs. There are two reasons why I think this is wrong. The first is that
societies around the world have long since socialized the basic literacy and
numeracy skills required for modern jobs through the institution of free
elementary and secondary public education and there is no reason at all for not
doing the same with regard to any additional skills needed by jobs that now
place one in the middle or upper middle-class. The second problem with this
explanation is that the lifetime compensation for the good jobs so far exceeds
the cost of tertiary education that that cost cannot reasonably explain how
much that lifetime compensation exceeds the lifetime compensation of jobs not
requiring a tertiary degree.
I am not interested in arguing about whether people who bother
to get the tertiary degree deserve the higher wages. What puzzles me is that
employers who are everywhere and always eager to drive down the wages of their
employees should collectively agree to reproduce a pyramidal wage structure
that essentially has the effect of transferring a portion of the surplus to the
higher paid workers, something that capital in general is not known for.
More and more these days capital is driving down labor costs
by undermining labor unions, and by substituting contract employees and
temporary employees for regular full-time employees. As I think I have observed
before in these pages, the modern gig economy, as it has come to be called, is a
recent perfection of this repressive tendency.
Since employers have no hesitation about driving down the
wages of their lower paid employees, what on earth keeps them from driving down
the wages of their higher paid employees? I simply do not understand. How might
an employer do this? Well, one answer is to lower the wages of the higher paid
employees while simultaneously throwing the positions open to jobseekers who do
not have tertiary degrees. Since I am absolutely convinced that what college students
gain from a college education is, for the most part, not at all required for
the successful performance of the jobs they eventually get, the employers would
lose nothing in productivity and gain something in a smaller wages bill.
But the pyramid of worker compensation seemingly gets
steeper, not less steep, as the years go by. I confess that I just do not
understand it.
Needless to say, my 51-year-old proposal for random
admissions to colleges and universities is not about to be adopted but if it
were, I am persuaded that the good effects would be enormous. Would employers
continue to favor graduates of the Ivy League if they knew that the graduates
of those elite institutions were as students no better than the graduates of
UMass or Ball State or North Carolina Central University?
It is an interesting question.
9 comments:
Why don't employers drive down the wages of higher paid employees as they do those of lower paid employees?
Class solidarity. They identify with and like their higher paid employees, managers, corporate lawyers, accountants and feel nothing except contempt for their lower paid employees. The higher paid employees are "people like us", people they could run into in their golf club or who might live in the same neighborhood as they do. It's class apartheid.
In response to your question, I have an hypothesis that is entirely speculative. The higher salaries of the upper management officers are a form of prestige validation. The President, CEO who earn the highest exorbitant salaries can justify their salaries by the fact that the lower tier upper management employees also have high salaries, but not as high as the first tier. The disparity in incomes between the second tier management employees and the lower tiers make those positions attractive and encourages competition. The more the lower tiers aspire and seek the higher tiers for their financial benefits, the more the highest tier believe they have earned and are entitled to the exorbitant salaries the Board of Directors awards them. In addition, they are looking out for their own children who may also go into business – not necessarily the same business as their parents – but to the extent the trend is replicated throughout the business community, the more likely their children will also receive the higher remuneration that upper echelon management receives. It has nothing to do, as you say, with the higher salaries being awarded for better management skills.
One minor point: I wasn't thinking of "good" or "elite" universities, specifically. I was thinking of the general expansion of the bachelor's degree (from any university) as a pre-requisite for a huge number of decent (not super-high-prestige) jobs. That has (I suspect) contributed to a general increase in the cost of college, anywhere, not just at elite schools—see e.g. this chart:
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=76
Regarding the steeply pyramidal structure of the modern capitalist job world: I vaguely recall some similar ideas coming out of the discussion of Piketty's big book several years back. (I, ehm, didn't read the book, and it was several years ago that I read the reviews, even, so please take this with several grains of salt.) As I recall, he (…or maybe some reviewers?…) made hay out of the fact that in modern corporations, stockholding owners are more or less absentee. Senior managers wield a great deal of power and influence, and use that influence to direct larger and larger portions of profit into their own pockets. (Sometimes in the form of larger and larger ownership shares of the company—but still not large enough to significantly dilute the value of the remaining shareholders.) As I recall it, Piketty (…or some people discussing him?…) noted that the accumulation of wealth he was describing was happening specifically among this class of super-compensated managers, despite their nominal status as employees.
A less intellectual comment than the preceding ones, I am afraid, but I think your voice machine has inserted another little something into the post, in the middle of the second sentence of paragraph 3, after 'credentials ac', until 'quired'.
Also, I like very much the idea of randomising admission to colleges.
RobertD, I love it!! My wife's son called while I was dictating and I forgot to turn the mike off, so it inserted part of what I said on the phone!! Garbage in garbage out, as the old techie saying has it. :) I edited it out.
'That still leaves open the question why the job world has the steeply pyramidal compensation structure that we see today'
Read Frank and Cook 'The Winner-Take-All Society"
Not all Winner-Take-All economies are economies of money. Sometimes they are economies of esteem as in Academia.
But the pyramid of worker compensation seemingly gets steeper, not less steep, as the years go by. I confess that I just do not understand it.
Economists would explain the existence of the pyramid by waving at principal-agent issues in Berle and Means corporations, i.e., firms in which ownership and management are distinct. Its increasing steepness is a different issue, explained perhaps by waving at Piketty's Capital in the Twenty-First Century; that is, the separation began coincidentally at a time when the distributions of wealth and income were relatively flat, and since that time, they have been returning to their more typical form. Michael Jensen had a large hand in popularizing approaches to executive compensation for addressing the agency issue that have led to the increasing steepness.
(Not sure if my first attempt to post went through but in case not:) I would have to think part of the explanation is that credentials, even if they don’t prove ability, do prove a certain knack and willingness for “playing the game”. This suggests at the very least that someone with credentials is much more likely to be a long-term, commitment employee, with the exact kind of motivational structure that makes its possible to incentivize them towards very clear and determinate goals of the company. The high wages are made up for not by ability but by the fact that one can be molded and shaped so successfully (this is why, too, companies will for example withhold and distribute bonuses or work out insurance in such a way that you cannot leave the company except at a huge cost to yourself. They want to hold onto the employees who have already been shaped and molded to their ends.)
Anonymous @1 a.m. is, I think, very much to the point here.
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