America's attention has been focused on ISIS for some time
now, culminating in the address by President Obama to the nation concerning the
actions he has decided to take. Always
remembering that I am mostly ignorant of the history of the region, totally
ignorant of its languages, and only fitfully aware of the details of the
religious beliefs being invoked as a justification of the actions of ISIS, I
should like to raise a question that I have not heard discussed. I welcome comments, particularly from any
readers who are more knowledgeable than I [which doesn't require much!]
In the decades after World War Two, international relations
was dominated by a state of mutual nuclear deterrence between the United States
and the Soviet Union, under which umbrella of relative safety both empires
pursued a variety of regional expansions, interventions, and wars, some
successful, such as the overthrow of Mossadegh in Iran by the United States and
the long-run domination of eastern Europe by the Soviet Union, some not successful,
such as the Viet Nam War and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, a quite different
situation emerged, posing a serious challenge to those in the United States who
wished to continue the enormous investment in the U. S. war machine even in the
absence of a credible threat to the United States [assuming, for the sake of
argument, that the Soviet Union ever posed such a threat, something I seriously
doubt.] Out of the confusion of those
early post-Cold War years there emerged the doctrine of "asymmetric
warfare" involving threats from, and wars against, what were called "non-state
actors."
The central idea of asymmetric warfare, pushed especially by
Donald Rumsfeld and in many ways adapted from the thought of Mao, is that in
conflicts between great powers like the United States and stateless collections
of "terrorists" like Al Qaida, it is, counterintuitively, the weaker
party that has certain advantages. As
interpreted by the neo-cons, this asymmetry demands even greater defense expenditures
[naturally] together with a fundamental reconfiguration of U. S. military forces
-- more Special Forces, and Psy-Ops programs, less in the way of big
muscle-bound agglomerations of hardware designed to win World War Two.
There is much to challenge in this vision of the new world
order, but the central insight is not at all stupid. Whether one considers attacks by small groups
of individuals against the persons and property of large states -- such as the
9/11 attacks we memorialize today -- to be a form of warfare or not, it is
quite true that the attackers, despite their small numbers and material
weakness, have certain advantages. The
most obvious advantage they possess is that they have no home address, if I may
speak somewhat facetiously. Precisely because
they are not the forces of territorial states, the target nation has great difficulty
knowing against whom to retaliate, or indeed even where to direct that
retaliation.
Enter the ISIS, which alone among all of the
"terrorist' groups that have launched attacks against people and property,
aspires to be a state, indeed, to be
a Caliphate. ISIS looks now to be making
a strenuous effort to seize, hold, and transform into a state a fairly large
swath of contiguous territory some of which is in Iraq and some of which is in
Syria. [I keep putting the word terrorist
in scare quotes because it is a matter of political evaluation and ideology,
not of fact, whether a group of people are terrorists, as opposed, let us say,
to freedom fighters. That said, ISIS seems to me from the reports
I have read to be a group completely without any redeeming social value
whatsoever, so I would be quite happy to see them killed.]
My question, to put it as simply as I can, is this: If ISIS succeeds in its ambition to become a
state, do they not then become easier
rather than more difficult to deal
with? As a stateless
"terrorist" group, it is amorphous, difficult to locate, difficult to
engage. As a state, it would be a small,
militarily weak regional power that ought to be quite susceptible to the usual
sorts of military, economic, and diplomatic pressures and containments. It would still be a horror to the population
it ruled, but that would not be a problem for the United States. It would pose a threat to the surrounding
Muslim nations, but that would be their problem, and one that perhaps they
would finally do something about.
This is, to be sure, a cold-eyed heartless view, but I think
that is an appropriate attitude for the United States to take to the rest of
the world, at least until that longed-for day when this country can be counted
on to weigh in on the correct side of disputes abroad, rather than always on
the wrong side.
I would be curious to hear your reactions.