From my careful reading of the Old Testament and the New Testament I had gained a sense of the Lord God as a vengeful God, a relentless God, even, to be sure, a forgiving God. But I confess that until now I had failed to realize that He is also a God with a sense of humor.
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In the Old Testament, he is a vengeful god. In the Hebrew Scriptures (NOT the same thing), he's an evolving deity trying to figure things out, and not doing a great job of it.
See Jack Miles's wonderful "God: A Biography."
S/he already shows a sense of humor early on, in Genesis, since s/he ribs Eve. (Boo, Hiss)
MS
There’s more.
Her humor continues through Exodus, when she gives Moses two tablets and tells him to call her in the morning.
MS (I am channeling Groucho Marx)
Years ago I read the wonderful book Jack Miles Pulitzer Prize winning, God: A Biography , where he teases apart the many threads of the biblical character of God by attending to his multiple names, showing the origin of the different characteristics of God as deriving from the fusion of multiple different gods into one.
On a more serious note, comments today by Justices Thomas and Alito on the convening of the Supreme Court are a harbinger of things to come should Barrett be confirmed. They attacked the decision recognizing the right of gays to marry, Obergefell v. Hodges, as violating the 1st Amendment freedom of religion rights of those who believe gay marriage is sinful. How allowing those willing to exercise that right infringes on the freedom of others is a paradox. And how requiring Kim Davis, the county clerk in Kentucky who was required to issue such marriage licenses, violated her freedom of religion is, indeed, a puzzlement – did her presence in the clerk’s office convert the office into a church, a transformation prohibited by the 1st Amendment's requirement of separation of church and state?
It is apparent that not only Roe v. Wade will be at stake should Barrett be confirmed.
MS
A Post-script:
In a prior comment to a previous post I noted that a state law which made it unlawful for people to dye their hair purple would violate substantive due process under the 14th Amendment, even though there obviously is no language in the Constitution guaranteeing people the right to dye their hair purple if they wish. Striking such a law down and allowing those who wish to dye their hair purple would not infringe on the rights of those who detest purple hair; nor would it force them to dye their hair purple. And if there were hair salons operated by the government, a hair stylist who detests purple hair would not thereby have the right to refuse to dye a customer’s hair purple – having taken the government job, the stylist would not have the right to impose his/her hair color preferences on the public. Such is my response to Justices Thomas and Alito regarding gay marriage.
MS
I recall after every national disaster, Pat Robertson comes out putting the blame on a democratic president or congress. I wonder who he's blaming for COVID?
“God is a comedian playing to an audience too afraid to laugh.”
Jung's "Answer to Job" is an interesting read as well, re: some of the discussion and books mentioned here.
Since we have tangentially touched on religion and whether God has a sense of humor, I would like, with Prof. Wolff’s indulgence, to ask his readers how they would respond to a hypothetical regarding their views on freedom of speech and freedom of religion, both of which are protected under the 1st Amendment. The general principle is that freedom of speech is protected if it is being exercised in a public place. Depending on the circumstances, the exercise of freedom of speech may not be infringed on by the government, including the courts. Under certain circumstances, government and the courts are allowed to place “reasonable time, place and manner” restrictions on the exercise of freedom of speech, for example, requiring that individuals who wish to engage in a protest march first obtain a permit from the local government.
Here is my hypothetical: Suppose a group of people were protesting on a public street in front of a mosque every Friday evening when Muslim adherents were entering the mosque to participate in their religion’s traditional Friday night service. Suppose the protesters, within view of the members of the mosque as they entered the mosque, were carrying signs which said such things as: “Muslims support ISIS”. “Muslims were responsible for 9/11”; “No more foreign aid for Saudi Arabia”; “American law; not Sharia law.” Suppose that the protesters did not block or interfere with the congregants’ entry into or exit from the mosque, and made no noise or sounds to interfere with the service. Suppose further that these protests occurred every Friday evening for several years. Would you maintain that their 1st Amendment freedom of speech cannot be regulated or curtailed under these circumstances, and that a court should not be allowed to place any restrictions on the protesters’ conduct, requiring, for example, that they be no closer than a certain distance from the mosque, and/or that they only be allowed to engage in their protests 1 hour before the services begin and one hour after they have concluded; and/or limiting the number of protesters and signs to something like no more than 5 signs at any given time? The protesters insist that such restrictions would violate their 1st Amendment freedom of speech, since they are engaging in political speech – regardless whether you agree or disagree with their political views – and are using a public street to do so.
MS
Ah, my apologies to Anonymous, who beat me to the punch referencing Jack Miles' book.
MS:
“Under certain circumstances, government and the courts are allowed to place “reasonable time, place and manner” restrictions on the exercise of freedom of speech, for example, requiring that individuals who wish to engage in a protest march first obtain a permit from the local government.”
The key word is “reasonable” in this statement. What exactly is reasonable? In accordance with practical reason or rationality? One can define practical reason/rationality in such a manner that it prioritizes freedom of speech over freedom of religion or vice-versa.
For example, a hard atheist could define practical reason such that it always prioritizes reason, argument, debate, and freedom of speech over faith, revelation, and freedom of religion. In that case, in view of “reasonable” restrictions on the protestors, the protestors’ freedom of speech trumps the Muslims’ freedom of religion. Thus, there should be no further restrictions (or virtually no restrictions period) on the peaceful, non-obstructive protestors.
However, if you use “reasonable” restrictions in a broad, vague, neutral sense that favors neither freedom of speech nor freedom of religion, then I would say the following. Since the protestors are holding signs with harsh, confrontational language (e.g. “Muslims support ISIS” and “Muslims were responsible for 9/11”) and since they’ve been protesting outside the mosque every Friday evening for *several* years (not just a few times per year), it is reasonable to impose further restrictions on them: they must maintain a certain distance from the mosque and they can protest only during certain periods (e.g. 1 hour before the service starts). I think it unreasonable to restrict how many people can attend the protest or how many signs they can hold. But, overall, yes, I think the protestors deserve further, specific restrictions in order to avoid harassment of the Muslims and possible physical conflict and uphold the Muslims’ freedom of religion.
C,
Thank you for your analysis. The cases in which this issue has arisen have involved abortion protesters in proximity to abortion clinics, or the home of a physician who performs abortions. The courts have to balance the 1st Amendment right of the protesters against the (at least now) constitutional right of women to obtain an abortion. Some women are probably reluctant to confront such opposition to their personal choice and may avoid going to an abortion clinic, or have become traumatized by having to pass by the guilt trip that the protesters put them through. The courts have refused to prohibit all such protests, as long as the protesters do not block the pathway to and from the clinic. In some cases they have placed distance restrictions of 100 to 150 feet from the property line of the clinic. As I indicate in a comment on a subsequent post, I am actually involved in litigation involving a fact situation similar to that which I describe in my hypothetical. Without divulging the position I am taking, I wanted to obtain a sense of how others, particularly non-lawyers, would view the question.
What you say about the meaning of “reasonable” is quite true. When I first switched from philosophy to law, I had difficulty taking the law exams because I tended to give long, detailed overly analytical answers to the exam questions, and could not finish the exams. Legal concepts like “beyond a reasonable” for guilt in criminal law gave me difficulty. In the study of torts and negligence, there is a concept of “the reasonable man standard” which is invoked. If one has read Descartes’ Meditations, in which he starts doubting everything, what constitutes being “reasonable” can be problematic. By my second year in law school I had learned my lesson and was prepared to give more practical, less philosophical answers to the exam questions and did much better.
Thank you again for your input.
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